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Learning from Failed Stabilisation: 
High Inflation and The Cruzado Plan in Brazil 
Introduction 
Brazil, under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, has made enormous 
progress in reducing inflation which in June 1994 was running at nearly fifty per 
cent per month. The Piano Real, named after the new currency introduced on 
1 July 1994, had lowered inflation to a monthly rate of less than two per cent by 
the beginning of 1995. Brazil, however, has adopted many inflation stabilisation 
programmes in the last decade and all before 1994 failed spectacularly. This 
Research Paper is a detailed study of the most spectacular failure of them all -
the Cruzado Plan. 
In February 1986, the Brazilian government announced the launch of the 
Cruzado Plan, a stabilisation programme which aimed to tackle drastically a 
long history of chronic and high inflation. The main elements of this anti-
inflation plan were the freezing of prices, wages and exchange rates, and 
monetary reform. Since 1984, programmes with similar stabilisation 
characteristics have been implemented in Argentina (in 1985), in Israel (in 1984 
and 1985) and in Mexico (in 1987) These anti-inflation plans have been called 
'heterodox' in contrast to orthodox stabilisation policies which are exclusively 
centred on fiscal and monetary austerity. 
Heterodox shock programmes always have a huge initial success with a very 
perceptible fall in the rate of inflation without major employment costs. But, in 
the case of Argentina and Brazil, the situation progressively deteriorated and the 
experience finished with an inflationary explosion. 
We will study in this paper the foundations of these stabilisation plans and 
Brazil's experience of the Cruzado Plan. The first part will present the analysis 
of the role of indexation mechanisms in an economy with very high inflation and 
the ineffectiveness of orthodox stabilisation when price inertia is the dominant 
element in the inflationary dynamic. We will afterwards see the relation between 
budget deficits and inflation, a privileged causality link in standard analyses of 
stabilisation policies. Finally, we will study the benefits and the limits of 
heterodox shock policies in obtaining lasting price stability. The second part will 
analyse the results of the Cruzado Plan and will show the errors both in its 
creation and in its implementation. 
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Part 1. Chronic Inflation, Indexation and Stabilisation 
If it is claimed that inflation is purely a monetary phenomenon, the creation of 
effective anti-inflation policies does not require the rigorous analysis of the 
evolution of markets, of the structure of contracts or other changes of the 
working of the economy under different inflationary regimes. If inflation is the 
obvious result of 'too much money chasing too few goods', it is only necessary 
to control the money supply to eliminate this undesirable curse. According to a 
more recent version of this approach to the inflationary process, you only need 
announce a money supply growth rate which is credible and compatible with a 
lower rate of inflation for agents to adjust their expectations, resulting in a lower 
rate of inflation. 
Once the 'true' cause of inflation is identified, the problem of determining 
the pertinent monetary aggregate will still need to be resolved. Moreover, the 
credibility of the announced policies necessitates a future budget deficit which 
is compatible with expected monetary policy (Sargent 1982, 1986). The link 
between monetary policy, budget deficits and inflation is therefore clearly 
established. 
On the other hand, when it is admitted that inflation is a more complex 
phenomenon, which may be due to monetary factors but not to exclusively 
monetary factors, the investigation of the researcher is more uncertain.2 A 
sensible monetary and fiscal policy is a necessary condition for maintaining 
stable prices, but is far from being a sufficient condition for successful 
disinflation. Examples of failures of anti-inflationary policies based only on 
fiscal and monetary austerity are legion. 
Heterodox stabilisation policies highlight supply-side analysis, price 
determination by private firms, wage adjustment mechanisms, the adjustment 
rules of exchange rates and of prices in the public sector. The recent experiences 
of heterodox shock in Argentina, Brazil, Israel and Mexico show the usefulness, 
but also the limits, of the use of income policies to reduce inflation in economies 
with a long inflationary history behind them. 
The foundations of heterodox stabilisation policies, and in particular the role 
of income policies, are analysed in this first part which contains seven sections: 
the first two deal with the phenomenon of price inertia and the impact of 
indexation mechanisms on inflationary dynamics and an evaluation of the effect 
of standard stabilisation policies in economies with chronic high inflation. 
The third section studies the foundations of an anti-inflation programme 
through the announcement of a budget policy that is consistent with Sargent's 
theories and shows that the success of such a programme requires the 
coordination of individual actions, rarely a condition satisfied spontaneously in 
a market economy. 
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The fourth and fifth sections present the advantages and limits of a 
stabilisation plan centred on incomes policies. The fourth section studies the 
impact of monetary and fiscal policies at the time of a change in the inflationary 
regime and evaluates the relation between budget deficits and inflation as well 
as the role of expectations and their potential destabilising effect in the presence 
of a long inflationary history. 
The fifth section presents an analysis of distributive compatibility problems, 
which arise from the unexpected freeze in prices and wages of private agents 
and then studies the mechanisms which permit the attainment of distributive 
neutrality under a heterodox shock. The sixth section presents and evaluates the 
recent controversies over inflation and stabilisation polices in Brazil. The 
seventh presents the conclusions of the first part of this paper. 
Price Inertia 
C. Bresciani-Turroni (1937), in his study of German hyper-inflation in the 
twenties, referred to Messedaglia, an Italian economist who introduced the 
concept of price inertia. Like other concepts in economics, this one experienced 
several rediscoveries. In all inflationary processes, in the North as well as the 
South, a part of price rises is due to price inertia.3 Current inflation has an 
'inherited' component from the past: today's inflation is partly determined by 
yesterday's inflation. This is even truer when implicit or explicit indexation 
mechanisms are introduced into the various contracts which govern economic 
life. Such indexation, in particular that of salary contracts, tends to become 
widespread in an environment of chronically high inflation. But why is this so? 
In a situation of high and variable inflation, the variation of relative prices4 
increases and the distribution of income becomes more unstable. Also, the real 
value of assets and liabilities held by the public and private sector fluctuate 
greatly, which can result in large transfers of wealth. The economy therefore 
becomes permeated with an unstable climate and uncertainty over the future 
state of the system, thus affecting the sources of current decisions. The length 
of contracts tends to fall in order to minimise renegotiation costs in the case of 
new information becoming available.5 However, permanent renegotiation cannot 
happen without supplementary costs; on the one hand, the cost of gathering the 
necessary information to take a decision, while on the other hand the probability 
of conflict between the concerned parties - and the expected costs - tends to 
increase with the frequency of negotiations. 
Under these conditions, even in the absence of compulsory indexation 
imposed by law, private agents often resort to voluntary indexation on past 
inflation as a rational mechanism of cost minimisation. In the absence of 'news' 
- supply side shocks, demand side shocks, and public price shocks (notably in 
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exchange rates) - the best conjecture is to anticipate that future inflation will be 
the same as today's. 
A stable inflation equilibrium based on inertia can thus be obtained. 
However, if indexation by past inflation is a simple rule minimising costs 
derived from chronic high inflation, the stability of the indexation regime faced 
with 'news' is fragile. The expectation or announcement of a price shock, 
particularly if it leads to an acceleration of inflation, will incite a renegotiation 
of the indexation rules. Typically, a fast acceleration in inflation will prompt 
calls for a reduction of the indexation period length, or ad hoc salary 
compensations. 
In a regime of lagged wage indexation - on past inflation - for a given period, 
the real wage is a negative function of inflation. An inflationary acceleration 
will therefore induce a fall in the real wage.6 An increase in wages greater than 
that which corresponds to inflation, or a reduction of the period between wage 
adjustments yields a real wage level which corresponds to a lower inflation 
level. In the case of a considerable disruption to the inflationary regime, certain 
agents would have an interest in demanding - or provoking - the breaking of the 
previous indexation rules. The frequent renegotiations and changes in the length 
of the periods of adjustment of wages during the development of German hyper-
inflation is an illustration of this phenomenon.7 In the case of firms, the 
expectation of an inflationary acceleration may induce the breaking of implicit 
rules of price adjustment according to past inflation. The anticipation of a future 
increase in production costs will be taken into account and firms will have a 
tendency to increase their profit margins on current prices (overpricing 
behaviour).8 
It can therefore be observed that, in an economy where wage indexation is 
widespread and in which this fact is common knowledge, the best conjecture for 
future inflation - in the absence of 'news' or various shocks - is to anticipate an 
identical inflation rate to the current one and act consistently with such 
expectation in a very simple framework. From these observations the 
inflationary dynamics in a standard indexed economy can then be specified. 
With a A referring to a variable's rate of change, the inflation rate pt at t ime ' t ' 
can be written as: 
(1) 
where p,T is the inflation rate of tradeable goods abroad, p1 is the inflation rate 
of industrial goods where they are imperfect substitutes of foreign goods, p,p, is 
the inflation rate of public sector prices (such as energy and public transport) 
and pf is the price of goods which are not traded (flexible prices), such as certain 
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fresh foods or services. These different prices are determined by the following 
equations: 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Price inflation of a tradable good is equal to the devaluation rate, et, plus the 
inflation rate in the international market, p*T. The price of an industrial good 
( p j ) is a function of wage costs, wt, and the cost of an imported intermediate 
good, p™ = et p*M, with a and b being the respective parts of the total cost. 
Moreover, the price of the industrial good depends on a factor of excess demand 
where Qf T and Q*T represent demand and supply respectively.9 Regarding the 
prices of public goods, ptp , the government follows an indexation rule to 
maintain constant real prices and to avoid the excessive disequilibrium of public 
enterprise finances. The exogenous variable, P, allows the introduction of 
public price shocks . A policy of austerity is often characterised by increases of 
ptpabove the inflation rate, i.e. P > 0, which is intended to increase public 
company revenues and reduce the government budget deficit. The inflation rate 
of a good which is not tradable or with flexible prices is specified according to 
a standard hypothesis: p{ is determined by the expected movement of the price, 
ep( , and by its market's excess demand (Qff and Q'f represent demand and 
supply respectively). The case of rational or adaptive expectations can equally 
be taken into account by this equation. 
The adjustment rules of nominal wages and the nominal exchange rate are: 
(6) 
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(7) 
The nominal wage, w,, is indexed to the inflation of the preceding period. The 
parameter O represents the coefficient of indexation; in the case of imperfect 
indexation (partial) 0 <; $ < 1, and W introduces the possibility of a salary 
shock.10 The exchange rate adjustment hypothesis assumes, in principle, a 
passive crawling peg rule which is intended to maintain a constant real exchange 
rate. However E takes account of exchange rate shocks. This would be the case, 
for example, of a maxi-de valuation with the aim of increasing the real exchange 
rate in response to an adverse external shock. 
The specified structural equations represent an economy with five goods: a 
tradable good, T, an exportable good, I;11 an imported intermediate good, M,12 
a public sector good, P, and a non-tradable good, f. From the equations (l)-(7), 
a reduced form of the rate of inflation is obtained. We note the constraints which 
are too often neglected by standard stabilisation policies. Under the assumption 
that p *Tt = p*Mt = 0, the following is obtained (assuming full indexation): 
(8) 
In the absence of shocks and a stationary equilibrium, i.e. assuming 
we obtain 
(9) 
Equation 9 describes a stationary inertial inflation equilibrium: actual inflation 
is determined by yesterday's inflation and the inertial component of inflation 
induces a stable inflation rate. The variability of inflation observed in countries 
with chronic inflation is due to various shocks and demand conditions. Large 
devaluations to adjust to the debt crisis are an obvious example. 
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Analysis of Equation 8 allows us to evaluate the impact of an anti-
inflationary policy where the sole instrument is the reduction of aggregate 
demand. A fall in demand has a disinflationary effect, but the unemployment-
inflation trade-off can be too unfavourable in an economy with a large inertial 
component. On the one hand it is limited in effect to the contraction of industrial 
sector profit margins, and the disinflationary impact on the flexible price sector, 
f; the part of the inflation rate associated with these effects tends to be very 
weak. On the other hand, if a large increase in the price of vegetables can 
produce a non-negligible acceleration of inflation in an economy with low 
inflation, a disinflation in the tomato market cannot be counted on to weaken 
inflation of 500% a year. 
A similar reasoning applies to the disinflationary effect of a reduction of 
profit margins of industrial firms as a result of demand contraction. If the impact 
can be large enough to reduce an inflation of 5% a year, the situation changes 
when inflation reaches very high levels. A reduction of profit margins of 3-4 
points can allow an inflation of 5% a year to be reduced by a third, but it is 
inconceivable to count on a reduction of profit margins noticeably to reduce an 
inflation rate of 500% when production costs increase at the rate of inertia, in 
this case 500%.13 Where the inertial component is large and inflation is very 
high, a stabilisation policy based only on demand control runs the risk of being 
not only very deceptive, but above all may generate enormous adjustment costs. 
The Fundamental'Anchor' of the System 
The previous analysis can be extended to other theories of inflation, based on a 
unique 'anchoring' of the price level. In opposition to the monetary measure, 
certain economists find the anchoring of inflation in wage dynamics or in 
exchange rate movements. 
The problems derived from the anti-inflation policies inspired by these 
theories can, once again, be illustrated by a simple numerical example. A 
reduction of the indexation coefficient on past inflation, , will allow the rate 
of wage inflation to fall, thus reducing inflation. A fall in $ from 1 to 0.6 will 
cause a perceptible reduction in inflation when its initial level is low. And if, 
because of other factors, inflation remains unchanged, for example at 5%, the 
fall in real wages will only be 2%. On the other hand, in the case of a rate of 
inflation of 500%, an identical exercise would imply a reduction in real wages 
of 33.3% for a very weak eventual disinflationary benefit. 
When the chosen anchor is the nominal exchange rate, an analogous 
calculation can be carried out, but the experience of the active crawling peg 
system in the southern cone of the Americas between 1978 and 1982 is the best 
example of the irrationality of such a policy.14 A transitional disinflation is 
obtained at the cost of a large revaluation of the real exchange rate until the 
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massive corrective devaluations cause an acceleration of the inflation rate (E > 0 
in Equation 8). 
It can again be noticed that, in an economy with high inflation where inertia 
is the dominant component, the use of an isolated stabilising instrument (in this 
case the exchange rate or wages) will produce a very small and probably very 
temporary disinflation at the cost of large disequilibria which must eventually 
be corrected. Nevertheless the difference between a high inflation regime and 
a hyper-inflation regime must be stressed. It is often asserted that the 
fundamental anchor of the system is the exchange rate, using hyper-inflationary 
experiences as an inspiration. In fact, it has been observed that in a number of 
hyper-inflation cases a process of widespread 'dollarisation' of contracts occurs, 
eliminating the characteristic coordination problem of chronically high inflation 
regimes (Winograd, 1985a). 
'A la Sargent' Stabilisation and Coordination Problems 
The dissatisfaction with these various anchors as anti-inflationary instruments 
leads us to reconsider the effect of consistent fiscal announcements 4 a la 
Sargent'. If inflation is a fiscal and monetary phenomenon and economic agents 
know this, a credible announcement which is compatible with stable prices will 
lead them to jump from a rational expectations inflationary equilibrium to a 
stable prices rational expectations equilibrium. And in the absence of 
unexpected shocks, the passage from an inflationary equilibrium to a stable price 
equilibrium occurs without any adjustment costs. A consistent and credible 
announcement would therefore constitute a sufficient condition to stabilise 
prices. 
While such an exercise can be logically sustained in an economy with two 
agents, the government and a private agent, it is difficult to rationalise this 
stabilising miracle in a decentralised economy with a great number of agents.15 
What is the decision-making process which leads all the concerned agents to 
jump jointly to the right equilibrium? The importance of studying the specific 
behaviour of markets in an economy with chronically high inflation, its contract 
structure and the role of indexation rules can thus be seen. 
The hypothesis of the effectiveness of a consistent fiscal announcement 
assumes that, if it is credible, agents will jump to the stable price equilibrium, 
this being in their interest since they would no longer have to suffer the inflation 
tax associated with the initial equilibrium. In our world of lagged indexation 
contracts, such behaviour would induce the various agents to renegotiate their 
contracts under a stable price hypothesis, without backward-looking clauses. It 
should result in contracts which are specified in nominal, non-indexed terms. 
But what is the incentive to renegotiate for non-indexed contracts when 
indexation dominates? 
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An indexed contract is better than a contract in nominal (stable price) terms, 
except in the case where salaried workers or creditors expect price deflation, 
which does not appear very probable in a quasi-hyperinflation environment. An 
indexed contract is equivalent to a nominal value contract when price stability 
materialises, but the first dominates the second in the case of persistent inflation. 
It is obvious that if all agents decided to go from an 'indexed inflationist world' 
to an 'un-indexed world of stable prices' in unison, then they would benefit from 
the disappearance of the inflation tax. But the essential characteristic of a market 
economy is the decentralisation of decisions and the difficulties of coordination 
of individual actions. If only a portion of agents renegotiate their contracts to 
exclude indexation clauses then they will be made worse off with persistent 
inflation. All agents are aware of this fact and, consequently, no one individual 
would voluntarily decide to renegotiate their contracts without indexation 
clauses. 
The answer to this coordination problem leads us to take into account a 
voluntary agreement between management, employees, unions and government 
or a close substitute: price and wage controls. It is therefore possible to identify 
the main element of heterodox shock plans. If the mechanisms sustaining the 
stabilising efficiency of a consistent fiscal announcement are rather unclear, the 
specific measures coordinating individual actions would lead the economy to a 
better equilibrium. 
Incomes Policy and Sustainable Stabilisation 
The economic controversies over the fundamental (and unique) anchor of the 
system in high inflation economies resemble the debate on a simple exercise 
such as the anchoring of a ship in a port whilst the crew is caught in a storm. No 
serious captain, forced to anchor his ship in the middle of a storm, would 
wonder which anchor to use. He will just drop all the ship's available anchors 
to save the ship. 
The preceding analysis gives us the foundations of price, wage and exchange 
rate control policies. An incomes policy allows the coordination of decisions of 
different agents and eliminates inflation inertia. But this policy implies a fixed 
vector of relative prices. And if the real exchange rate (or real wage) is 'fixed' 
at too low a level, a revision will eventually need to take place, endangering the 
stabilisation strategy. The type of problem associated with the use of a single 
anchor will reemerge. Price controls therefore need to be established with a 
sustainable vector of relative prices. 
An incomes policy which coordinates individual actions is thus a necessary 
condition to lead the price equilibrium, but it is certainly not a sufficient 
condition to push the economy into a stable price equilibrium. Appropriate 
management policy becomes a fundamental instrument. A careful monetary and 
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fiscal policy should be undertaken once incomes policy eliminates inertial 
inflation. Faced with an over-expansionist monetary and fiscal policy which is 
incompatible with price stability, the initial success of large disinflation obtained 
through the use of controls can be temporary. When prices are controlled, the 
excess demand will lead to quantitative rationing in the markets with controlled 
prices and the adjustment of prices in markets without controlled prices 
(financial assets and markets with flexible prices). And when prices are 
stabilised, large variations in certain markets - 'the tomatoes' - again become 
a not inconsiderable source of inflation. Moreover, in an economy with a recent 
and long history of high inflation, the 'memory of inflation' is very persistent 
and a succession of bad signals can render the economic environment rapidly 
uncontrollable. 
Monetary Policy and Stability 
In a situation where an economy is shifted from a high inflation equilibrium to 
a stable price equilibrium, prudence in monetary and fiscal policy has more to 
do with skill than a rigorous econometric estimate. A contraction of the money 
supply is not synonymous with prudence. The movement from a high inflation 
regime to one of stable prices causes an increase in the real demand for money 
and a restrictive monetary policy risks producing an undesired contraction of 
production. Given the instability of money demand when a strong disinflation 
occurs, the subsequent monetary policy should not come from monetary 
aggregate targets alone. 
Budget Policy and Stability 
Standard macroeconomic analysis often attributes persistent inflation to budget 
deficits. While this can be a source of inflation, the analysis of recent chronic 
inflation experiences as well as hyper-inflations shows the opposite effect can 
dominate: i.e. inflation causing a budget deficit. The Graham-Olivera-Tanzi 
effect is the reason.16 When facing delays in the payment of taxes, variations in 
the inflation rate cause variations in real tax collection. The extent of the fiscal 
lag will depend on the inflation level and the structure of the tax system. In the 
extreme case of Germany's inter-war hyperinflation, budget revenue only 
represented 1 % of state spending in 1923 before the stabilisation of the mark in 
October, and then increased to 33% in December and 88% six months later.17 
C.Bresciani-Turroni (1937) estimates that new taxes did not exceed 8% of the 
total tax recovery in 1924. On the other hand, state spending did not show any 
appreciable variation after the success of the stabilisation. The increase in the 
real tax collection and the fall in the budget deficit were the result of the price 
stability and the elimination of the inflationary impact on real tax income.18 
Paradoxically, attempts to reduce the budget deficit, which are supposed to 
reduce inflation, often have the opposite effect. Against the difficulty of 
reducing public spending, governments have recourse to the elimination of price 
subsidies on certain products and price increases in public industries. The fall 
in public company losses allows the reduction of the budget deficit at the cost of 
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an acceleration in inflation. A public price shock is represented by P > 0 in 
Equation 8. The mechanisms of indexation transmit the initial shock and 
perpetuate the inflationary effect. 
When the fiscal lag effect is strong, a policy of budget austerity hingeing on 
public price increases can lead to the opposite result to that wanted: the increase 
of the budget deficit. On the one hand, the public price shock allows the 
reduction of public sector losses with the positive corrective result of a fall in 
state budget spending. But on the other hand, the inflation acceleration has a 
negative impact on public finances due to the fiscal lag effect. The composition 
of the budget is changed, but the net effect risks being the opposite of the 
objective set by policy makers (i.e. an increase in the budget deficit). In this 
case it is inflation which causes the budget deficit and not the opposite. This is 
typical of the 'surprising' impact of exchange rate devaluation shocks. The 
acceleration of inflation associated with a larger budget deficit seems to support 
the stance of orthodox economists, but the link is not the one they envisage. 
It is therefore observed that, for a given price vector, a large disinflation can 
result in a real increase in tax revenues and a reduction in the budget deficit. 
Disinflation will also positively affect the real monetary wealth of the private 
sector: the inflation tax falls. A recomposition of state finances happens as a 
result of the instantaneous stabilisation of prices. Explicit taxes are substituted 
for the inflation tax. The net effect on aggregate demand is uncertain, 
particularly as those agents who suffer the inflation tax are not necessarily those 
who pay explicit taxes. The former are mainly workers with low incomes while 
the latter tend to be private companies and households with higher incomes, 
depending on the structure of the tax system. 
The budget deficit is also linked to inflation through the effect of interest 
payments on the public debt (both home and abroad) due to inflation. This is a 
simple mechanism, but one which has been at the centre of important 
controversies between the officials of the IMF and the monetary authorities in 
Brazil. The servicing of internal debt has both a nominal debt adjustment 
component and a real interest rate component. For a given real interest rate, an 
increase in the inflation rate implies a higher nominal interest rate leading to a 
higher budget deficit. The nominal part of the interest payments compensates for 
the reduction, through inflation, of the real debt. 
When inflation is low, this effect can be disregarded. Suppose, for example, 
that the inflation rate is 3% and the nominal interest rate 7%, which implies a 
real interest rate of 4%. With a ratio of public debt/GDP of 0.3, the inflationary 
part of servicing the debt represents 0.9% of the GDP. In the case of a high 
inflation economy, this effect becomes much larger. Assume now that the 
inflation rate is 100%, the real interest rate still being 4%; the nominal part of 
the debt interest now becomes 30% of GDP. In fact, for a given level of real 
public debt, the real servicing (4% a year) is identical, whether the regime is 
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one of high or low inflation. But in the second case the nominal part of the 
interest must compensate for a higher inflation rate. 
Two budget deficit concepts are therefore used: the current deficit and the 
deficit adjusted for inflation.19 The first incorporates total interest rates (real and 
nominal) and consequently overestimates the growth of the real public debt, the 
second only counts the real interest of public debt.20 So, as a result of price 
stabilisation (leaving the real interest rate unchanged), the current inflation rate 
will fall, whereas the deficit adjusted for inflation will remain unchanged.21 
Expectations and Stability 
Fiscal and monetary policy prudence should take into account the various 
considerations listed above, but this policy will be greatly affected by the 
expectations of private agents. At the time of a heterodox shock, if prices have 
been stabilised, the economy will still not have forgotten its long history of 
chronic high inflation and relative price instability. It would be a mistake to 
believe that the stabilisation shock will instantly transform the system by 
replicating an economy with a long history of stable prices. The memory of 
inflation will always remain bright and bad signals will lead to a rapid 
destabilisation. In particular, we should note that financial markets are 
dominated by very short term positions. A sudden change in the expected returns 
of an asset will always lead to a quick and massive reallocation of private sector 
portfolios. 
A monetary and fiscal policy which is in principle consistent with stable 
prices can be judged to be inconsistent by the private sector. This specific 
perception of economic reality by agents conditions their decision-making 
processes. If the incomes policy imposes fixed prices, private agents make 
decisions on production, consumption and the allocation of their portfolios. The 
fiscal and monetary programme will be incorporated into the decision making 
processes of the private sector - firms and households. When the beliefs of 
agents lead them to estimate that the fiscal and monetary policy appears 
incompatible with the incomes policy, their actions will reflect such beliefs. In 
certain cases the authorities will not be able to avoid acting to suit the beliefs of 
the private sector, no matter how ill-judged they seem. 
Suppose, for example, that the government announces a fiscal and monetary 
policy which is consistent with price stabilisation, particularly taking into 
account the expected increase in the quantity of real money and the effect of 
fiscal lags. Nevertheless it is deemed too expansionist by the private sector and 
therefore perceived as incompatible with stable prices. Stabilisation by the use 
of controls will therefore be considered as transitory and will result in an 
expectation of a future acceleration of inflation. Current prices of goods will 
therefore be lower than expected prices, provoking an increase in consumption 
demand and an accumulation of stocks by firms. This inter-temporal substitution 
effect in the goods market can lead to quantitative rationing and the consequent 
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appearance of black markets, reinforcing the (corrective) price expectation 
adjustment. 
Concerning financial markets, the expectation of a price increase will induce 
a fall in the expected real interest rates compared to the current real interest 
rate. The demand for credit will increase, in the anticipation of the future 
inflationary erosion of acquired liabilities. If the demand for goods increases 
there will also be a reallocation of financial asset portfolios. The demand for 
non-indexed assets falls and the demand for foreign or dollar linked assets will 
increase. 
When the availability of foreign exchange is a constraint on the economy, an 
inflationary push will eventually be followed by a correction in the exchange 
rate. Without exchange rate controls, the public will expect an increase in the 
demand for foreign exchange and losses in the Central Bank foreign exchange 
reserves. Eventually, the monetary authorities will be forced to devalue in order 
to stabilise the foreign exchange market. Under a regime of exchange rate 
controls, the increase in the demand for foreign currency will produce an 
increase in the foreign exchange price on the parallel (free) market. The 
differential between the official exchange rate and the free exchange rate will 
thus rise, causing under-invoicing (over-invoicing) of exports (imports). The 
current account balance will deteriorate and a devaluation of the official 
exchange rate will be required to avoid (or redress) a balance of payments crisis. 
The quantitative rationing of the goods market, as well as deteriorations in 
the current account, is the result of private sector convictions that led it to 
anticipate a temporary price stabilisation and not a permanent change in the 
inflationary environment. A fairly current theory, and one that is not necessarily 
strange, supports these beliefs: you only need to believe in the stability of the 
real demand for money and to ignore the existence of the Graham-Olivera-Tanzi 
effect. Alternatively the incorrect perception that certain prices have been fixed 
at too low a level can also play a destabilising role. An expectation of an 
inflationary revision of prices will set off speculative behaviour in the goods and 
financial assets markets. These beliefs can thus become self-fulfilling 
prophecies.22 
Facing these destabilising expectations, the government has little room for 
manoeuvre. It either maintains the announced fiscal and monetary programme 
and the persistence of disequilibria of the various markets will cause corrective 
adjustments of prices and the exchange rate, or the government tries to 
'discipline expectations' by toughening monetary policy. In the first case 
demand pressures will be eliminated, but the economic authorities will have 
validated the expectations of the private sector and the stabilisation will 
effectively be temporary. The ('false') beliefs will have therefore played the role 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the second case, the government will adjust the 
monetary policy and an increase in expected nominal (and real) interest rates 
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will be necessary to force private agents to liquidate their speculative stocks of 
goods and financial assets. The increase in the interest rate can cause a serious 
problem for the expected future budget deficit, if there is a large public debt 
quoted in domestic currency. It will therefore be necessary to convince the 
private sector that there has been a change of regime and that stabilisation is not 
temporary. 
Contracts, Unexpected Synchronisation and Stabilisation 
In an economy with widespread indexation, the various indexed contracts 
(wages, rents) will not necessarily be synchronised. When, for example, the 
contracts are indexed twice a year, every month a fraction of their worth 
undergoes a readjustment of its nominal value: readjustments are therefore de-
synchronised. 
The desynchronisation of contracts causes a distributive compatibility 
problem with a policy of price fixing: the abrupt elimination of inflation would 
imply that workers, with an identical real average wage (over the whole of the 
indexation period23), will see their real wages fixed at different levels because 
their contracts were not simultaneously readjusted. Assume that two workers 
have the same average real wage, but one of them had a nominal readjustment 
of his wage one month before stabilisation whereas the wage readjustment of the 
second happened five months before. The real wage, following the stabilisation 
shock of the first, will therefore be higher than that of the other one. A similar 
reasoning can be applied to rents. 
Various solutions might be envisaged, and we will look at three: (i) the 
announcement of a future price freeze, which will provoke a voluntary 
restructuring of contracts; (ii) an administrative resynchronisation of contracts 
in the period before the stabilisation shock; (iii) a conversion rule applied by the 
government simultaneously with the price freeze. 
In the first case, the resynchronisation could happen at the cost of an 
inflationary explosion. The announcement of a future price freeze will set off 
defensive behaviour on the part of the private sector who will want to achieve 
D-day with sustainable real prices (real incomes). This protective reaction, 
rational from an individual's point of view, is not so from the collective point 
of view as it can lead to hyper-inflation before the shock. 
The second type of solution will have recourse to a reduction of the 
indexation period to one month. The readjustment of different classes (according 
to the months which would set off the readjustment) or workers will therefore 
be synchronised, but at the cost of inflation acceleration. To avoid the 
inflationary impact and to maintain the real average wage, the indexation regime 
must be modified to introduce a partial readjustment of the nominal wage based 
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on past inflation. However, such a measure will, without a doubt, meet with 
strong resistance from workers. 
The government could equally maintain the indexation period unchanged (for 
example six months), but wipe out the monthly readjustment of accumulated 
inflation.24 If accumulated inflation during the indexation period (6 months) is 
50%, the nominal wages of the concerned class will be readjusted by 6.99% in 
the six months following. The wage readjustments of all classes of workers will 
eventually be synchronised and, with a constant inflation rate, the monthly 
readjustments will avoid the inflationary impact of a reduction of the indexation 
period. However, this will not lead to distributive neutrality in the case of an 
inflationary acceleration - for example provoked by a supply-side shock - during 
the transition period. 
If the resynchronisation of readjustments is perceived to be a preparatory 
measure to freezing prices, the defensive behaviour associated with the 
announcement of a freeze will again reappear. Inflation could therefore increase 
in the period before the shock. 
The third solution to the desynchronisation of contracts is the administrative 
conversion of contracts at the time of the price freeze. This measure allows for 
the distributive neutrality of the price freeze. A monetary reform will allow the 
conversion of contracts in 'old money' into contracts in 'new money'. The 
scheme for the conversion of contracts, required to obtain a neutral price freeze, 
should fix a real value of wages (rents) in new money identical to the average 
real wage - for the indexation period - in old money. 
The conversion of contracts done simultaneously with a price freeze will 
improve the effect of the 'surprise' stabilisation shock and therefore help avoid 
destabilising behaviour in the period preceding the stabilisation. It must be noted 
that the desynchronisation of contracts tends to disappear with the acceleration 
of inflation. An increased rate of inflation leads to a reduction in the indexation 
periods. Eventually the indexation becomes monthly - wages are readjusted by 
the previous month's inflation rate - and the readjustments are, as a result 
synchronised. The problem of desynchronisation of contracts and its distributive 
impact as a result of a stabilisation shock becomes non-existent. This was the 
case of the Argentine economy before the Austral Plan, where the readjustments 
of wages and rents were done on a monthly basis. It can be stated that, 
paradoxically, in a chronic inflation regime, the stabilisation can be simplified 
when inflation is higher.25 
The price freeze raises a second distributive problem, linked this time to 
financial contracts. In an inflationary environment, the nominal interest rate 
includes the expected interest rate. When a stabilising shock happens, the 
nominal interest rate becomes the real interest rate. When inflation is very high, 
an unexpected stabilisation of prices can produce an enormous transfer of wealth 
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between debtors and creditors. This phenomenon is known as the Fisher effect. 
With a monthly inflation of 25% and a nominal interest rate of 26%, a credit 
contract of 3 months will have a real expected interest rate of 3%. An 
unexpected freeze in prices, eliminating inflation one day after the negotiation 
of credit, would imply a real effective interest rate for three months of 100%, 
identical to the nominal interest rate, whereas the real expected interest rate was 
only 3%. 
The enormous transfer effect between debtors and creditors as a result of this 
phenomenon would not only imply the non-distributive neutrality of the 
stabilisation policy, but also could lead to the insolvency of numerous debtors 
and, consequently, to a severe financial crisis. The size of the transfer effect 
will depend on the type of dominant financial contract. The transfer effect will 
be even more important where the part played by credits (or debts) with prefixed 
nominal interest rates is large. In the case of indexed financial operations - the 
nominal interest rate is fixed after inflation is known - this effect will be 
irrelevant. 
To avoid this transfer problem, the government should define a conversion 
rule for contracts simultaneously with price stabilisation. The aim of such a 
conversion would be to deflate contracts at a nominal prefixed interest rate to 
eliminate the inflation component. A financial reform would also allow the 
realisation of this operation: the financial contracts (at prefixed nominal interest 
rates) in old money depreciate over time in terms of the new money. The 
(predetermined) depreciation rate should be a proxy for the expected inflation 
incorporated in old money contracts. 
Brazilian Controversies over Inflation and Stabilisation 
In the 1970s and 1980s, two controversies on inflation and stabilisation policy 
attracted the attention of many Brazilian economists. The first can be 
summarised by the estimate of the Phillips curve for Brazil and by evaluating the 
adjustment costs associated with an orthodox stabilisation policy of fiscal and 
monetary austerity. The second centres on the alternative stabilisation policies 
to standard demand control strategies. 
The empirical evidence revealed by the controversy over the Phillips curve 
in Brazil (A.C. Lembruger, 1974; C. Contador, 1977, 1982; A. LaraResende 
andF. Lopes, 1981, 1982; F. Lopes, 1982; E. Modiano, 1983, 1985a and J. G. 
Almeida Reis, 1985) shows that the impact of demand variations on the 
movements of wages and prices is very small. The adjustment costs associated 
with an anti-inflationary policy of demand control are thus very high. The 
inertial factor, i.e. the inflation rate of the preceding period, appears to be an 
essential element in explaining price and wage dynamics. These studies 
explaining the failure of the orthodox stabilisation policies undertaken in Brazil 
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between 1981 and 1984 reinforced the 'inertialist' approach to inflation. During 
this period, the economic recession and the rise in unemployment did not 
produce an appreciable fall in the inflation rate. The thoughts of 
macroeconomists were therefore aimed towards alternative stabilisation policies, 
aiming to attack inertial inflation. 
The second controversy was thus born from the failure of orthodox 
stabilisation policies and of a diagnosis which identified price inertia as the 
fundamental cause of inflationary persistence in economies with chronic high 
inflation. In 1984, F. Lopes (1984a) presented his proposition of a 'heterodox 
shock' to face inertial inflation. Two years later, this would inspire the Cruzado 
Plan.26 Summarising his main assertion, Lopes stated that 'If inertial inflation 
tends to perpetuate itself and resists monetary and budgetary controls, what can 
be done to eliminate it ? In our opinion, the only effective solution is "heterodox 
shock". Contrary to orthodox shock which centres on monetary and fiscal 
contraction with a liberalisation of the price system, heterodox shock is 
characterised by a total freeze in prices coupled with monetary and fiscal 
liberalisation.' Concerning fiscal and monetary policy, the main objective 
should be to reduce the real interest rate and to stimulate public and private 
investment to restart the growth process. The production expansion should allow 
firms to withstand the initial price freeze and the controls which would follow.27 
The main idea was the total deindexation of the economy by the use of a 
price freeze, with a passive fiscal and monetary policy or even an expansionary 
policy. Although the need for a monetary expansion at the time of price 
stabilisation had been shown, Lopes failed to note the importance of a demand 
policy that was consistent with price stability and ignored the role of private 
sector expectations and their potential destabilising effect.The identification of 
the inertial component as a determining factor of the inflationary dynamic leads 
to a price freeze and a very large (and fast) disinflation, but the proposed 
monetary and fiscal policy is not consistent with a stable price regime. 
This ambiguity rests in part upon the fact that certain economists link the 
memory of inflation to the indexation mechanisms which transfer past inflation 
to the present. The deindexation should therefore eliminate the 'memory of 
inflation',28 but this is not the case. The memory of inflation takes into account 
the long history of chronic inflation and is incorporated into the process of 
expectations formation: a 'bad' signal (actual or believed) activates the 
defensive mechanisms which characterise the behaviour of agents in a chronic 
high inflation regime. 
In this first formulation of heterodox shock, the wage policy envisages the 
payment of a bonus to workers whose real wage was fixed at too low a level. But 
other workers will have their real wages fixed at too high a level, higher than the 
average real wage of the indexation period; this will be the case, for example, 
where a worker's wage was adjusted one month before the shock. A large 
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distortion of the wage structure could therefore result, with the risk of creating 
pressure for inflationary revision of wages. In any case, the first proposition of 
heterodox shock did not foresee any measures to adjust lease and credit contracts 
(at prefixed rates) embodying an inflation expectation which did not materialise. 
The effect of this transfer between creditors and debtors, provoked by the 
'surprise' stabilisation of prices, therefore remained without solution. 
In the second version of the heterodox shock, Lopes (1984b) adds to the main 
measures - the freezing of prices and a programme of monetary and fiscal policy 
- a monetary reform which solves the contracts' desynchronisation problem and 
the effects of the transfer of income and wealth. Neutrality from the distributive 
point of view is therefore strengthened. The monetary reform introduces a new 
monetary unit, the 'cruzado', which should replace the cruzeiro. The conversion 
from contracts quoted in cruzeiros into contracts quoted in cruzados is expected 
to correct the redistributive impact of the price freeze. The specific conversion 
rules were later developed by Modiano (1985b). 
During 1984, a month after the proposed heterodox shock by Lopes, Lara 
Resende (1984) suggested the introduction of an 'indexed money' to remove 
inertial inflation. The basis of this plan was developed afterwards by Arida and 
Lara Resende (1984). The new money which they proposed would therefore be 
indexed, with the exchange rate in cruzeiros determined by the variations of the 
already existing indexed public securities, the ORTN (Readjustable Obligations 
of the National Treasury). The new currency would have a fixed parity with the 
ORTN and its value in terms of cruzeiros would be fixed every day. The other 
essential characteristics of the monetary reform proposed by Arida and Lara 
Resende are given below. 
Financial Assets and Liabilities 
The indexed money (IM) and the cruzeiro, in this scheme, will circulate 
simultaneously and there will be a free exchange between the two currencies. 
The free convertibility is necessary to avoid the repudiation of the old money, 
which will lead to a hyper-inflationary explosion in cruzeiros. Credit contracts 
can be renegotiated in IM or stay under their original form in cruzeiros. This 
measure is neutral when it consists of indexed credit (nominal postfixed interest 
rate), but is important when it consists of credits at nominal prefixed interest 
rates. The government will do all its financial transactions in IM hoping thereby 
to induce a strong preference for the new currency. Deposits on current accounts 
(deposit, savings, etc) will equally be instantly convertible into IM. Deposits on 
current accounts will thus escape the cruzeiro inflation tax. 
Prices 
The prices determined by the government (or by public firms) will instantly be 
converted into IM. Specific conversion rules will be used: the price in IM will 
be equalised with the indexation period's real average price (in ORTN). The 
private sector will have the option of fixing prices in IM or in cruzeiros. 
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The exchange rate 
The nominal cruzeiro exchange rate will follow the passive crawl rule: mini-
devaluations will compensate for cruzeiro inflation. The nominal exchange rate 
in IM will therefore be fixed, as well as the real exchange rate (excluding 
international inflation) that prevailed before the monetary reform. 
Wages and other indexed contracts (rents) 
Wages in cruzeiros will continue to be indexed, according to law, every six 
months. The conversion of salaries into IM will be voluntary, but following a 
predetermined rule: the value in IM should be equivalent to the average real 
wage level in cruzeiros of the preceding six months. The same conversion rule 
will be applied to leases and other indexed contracts. During the transitionary 
period of monetary reform, the IM and the cruzeiro will circulate 
simultaneously. But for every level of inflation, the IM inflation tax will be less 
than that in cruzeiros. Therefore, there will be a definite reason to use the IM 
as a means of exchange. To strengthen the substitution of IMs for cruzeiros after 
the transitionary period, the government will no longer publish cruzeiro price 
indexes and will fix a constant rate of exchange to the IM. An explicit incentive 
for conversion into IM of contracts in cruzeiros will result if the conversion rate 
is fixed above that of past inflation. 
Arida and Lara Resende agreed with Lopes on the diagnosis of inflation 
inertia, but they add that the advantage of the IM programme over that of 
heterodox shock is that the changing of the inflationary regime is voluntary and 
does not rely on administrative controls which risk producing large dist-
ortions.29 Moreover, they consider that the difficulties of a practical execution 
of price controls and salaries are insurmountable. 
The IM programme, undoubtedly extremely ingenious, is not without 
problems. Modiano and Carneiro (1984) noted that the stability of the new 
money is not guaranteed: if inflation of cruzeiros accelerates during the 
transitionary period, the IM will suffer inflation and a loss of credibility could 
ensue. Moreover the acceleration of inflation in cruzeiros, by the phenomenon 
of inflationary contamination, could induce the indexation of contracts in IM.30 
It must be noted that the neutrality and the voluntary nature of the IM 
programme are not obvious. If the conversion of contracts is, in principle, 
voluntary, Arida and Lara Resende defined the specific rules which must be 
followed: the conversion by the real average value of the six preceding months 
of public prices, wages and rent contracts. These conversion rules are necessary 
to guarantee distributive compatibility of the system. There is no particular 
reason assuring that private agents will voluntarily adapt to these rules. If this 
is not the case, there is a risk of resurgence of IM inflation: for example, when 
there is widespread conversion to a real value higher than that of the average. 
To avoid this problem the government should administratively fix the 
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conversion mechanisms of private contracts.31 Contrary to the belief of the 
authors, the voluntary nature of the IM programme is not necessarily an 
advantage. For if the conversion of contracts remains voluntary, it would be 
prudent that the conversion mechanism be predetermined by the government. In 
this case, however, the main critique of the heterodox shock programme would 
apply equally well to a consistent IM programme. 
Conclusions 
In this first part the foundations of the heterodox shock approach have been 
discussed. The analysis shows that under chronic high inflation, it is not realistic 
to count exclusively upon a reduction of the budget deficit to obtain an 
appreciable reduction in the inflation rate. If the adjustment costs derived from 
the orthodox stabilisation policies, in terms of unemployment, are very great 
when inflation is weak, they may become insupportable in a regime of high 
inflation, where indexation mechanisms based on past inflation are wide-
spread.32 In certain cases, a policy of fiscal austerity may lead to an acceleration 
of inflation and, paradoxically, through the fiscal lag effect induce a perverse 
increase in the budget deficit. 
It can also be observed that in a market economy with a large number of 
agents, an announcement of a prudent budget policy ('a la Sargent') is not a 
sufficient signal to incite all the concerned agents to deindex their contracts. The 
elimination of the inflationary inertia problem requires a coordinated action on 
the part of private and public sector agents. Without voluntary co-ordination, a 
'policy of co-ordination' imposed by the government becomes a public good. 
This need for co-ordination leads to the heterodox shock approach. 
The absence of co-ordination also explains the failure of stabilisation policies 
where the only instrument is the control of a unique nominal anchor, such as the 
exchange rate, wages, or public prices. The exception that should be noted 
concerns the case of widespread 'dollarisation' of wages and price (as well as 
other contract) decisions, that are observed in extreme cases of certain 
hyperinflations (Winograd, 1985a). 
An incomes policy allows the co-ordination of individual actions and the 
elimination of inertial inflation. The distributive neutrality of a heterodox shock 
programme can be achieved by a monetary reform introducing a new currency 
and the conversion of contracts linked to the past (backward-looking) to their 
real average value, whereas the contracts linked to the future (forward-looking) 
are deflated by a proxy of expected inflation. It is also observed that the 
conversion rules are less complex when they are synchronised. 
The shift from a regime of high inflation to a regime of stable prices will 
lead to an increase in the real demand for money which should be taken into 
HIGH INFLATION AND THE CRUZADO PLAN IN BRAZIL 21 
account by the monetary authorities. The stabilisation of prices should also 
produce an increase in the real recovery of taxes, thanks to the Graham-Olivera-
Tanzi effect. In this case, it is a fall in the inflation rate which produces a fall 
in the budget deficit, and not the opposite. 
In an environment of chronic high inflation, an incomes policy appears to be 
an interesting tool to drive the economy to a stable price equilibrium. But the 
stabilisation risks being temporary since it lacks consistent monetary and fiscal 
policies. These should take into account, in particular, the potentially 
destabilising expectations of the private sector. The Cruzado Plan, studied in the 
next section, is a good example of temporary heterodox stabilisation. 
Part II The Cruzado Plan: Experiences and Lessons 
In this part, we present an analysis of the Cruzado Plan, the heterodox shock 
programme implemented in Brazil in February 1986. After a remarkable initial 
success with a fall of yearly inflation from 300% to 15%, this stabilisation 
experiment ended in an inflationary explosion at the beginning of 1987. The 
failure of this heterodox shock programme was largely due to conceptual errors 
as well as the phenomenon of policy 'paralysis' of the decision makers who 
refused for too long to allow any readjustment of the announced plan. 
The constraints which are imposed on an economy with a fixed price regime, 
as well as the fragility of newly acquired stability, were ignored: a non-
negligible set of prices was initially frozen at too low a level; coupled with over-
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy and large increases in real wages, this 
led to widespread excess demand in the economy. Finally, the government 
renounced its plans to reduce inflation and Brazil found itself with a higher rate 
of inflation than before the Plan. 
This second part of our study is divided into four sections: the first analyses 
the initial conditions which characterised the Brazilian economy when the 
Cruzado Plan was announced. The second section presents the fundamental 
measures of this plan, then the third section discusses its results. The last section 
describes the lessons that can be drawn from this heterodox stabilisation 
programme. All tables have been placed in the Statistical Appendix. 
The Initial Conditions 
The Cruzado Plan was announced on the 28th February 1986, and that month's 
inflation was 12.7%, (319.8% in yearly figures). Brazil had had a long history 
of chronic high inflation, but the economy had undergone an important change 
of inflationary regime in 1979, when inflation jumped from 40% to 100%.33 
This acceleration in inflation was the result of the second oil shock and the 
22 LEARNING FROM FAILED STABILISATION 
adjustment policy pursued by the government: a maxi-corrective devaluation of 
the exchange rate to improve external balance. Moreover, the authorities had 
modified the wage indexation rule to allow a fall of the indexation period from 
one year to six months, strengthening the rise in the inflation rate. 
Between 1980 and 1982, inflation remained stable at 100%. The balance of 
trade showed a net improvement during this period, but the increase of the 
international interest rate led to the deterioration of the current account. In 1983, 
a new maxi-devaluation, coupled with an austere monetary and fiscal policy, 
was implemented to tackle the foreign trade imbalance and reduce inflation. 
This policy caused a large contraction of economic activity and a decrease in the 
current account deficit. But, contrary to the expectations of the economic 
authorities, inflation accelerated from 100% to 200% and stayed fairly stable 
until the first half of 1985. 
Between 1979 and 1984, inflation thus increased from 40% to 200% despite 
the orthodox stabilisation policies followed by the government. A persistent 
economic recession did not result in a fall in the rate of inflation. The fiscal 
adjustment brought about a reduction in the adjusted budget deficit, but the 
acceleration of inflation caused a large increase in the nominal budget deficit 
(Table 1) due to the increase in the nominal interest rate on internal public 
debt.34 The adjustment policies undertaken from 1981 managed to stabilise the 
external accounts at the cost of a fast acceleration of inflation: the current 
account balance, which had been recording average deficits of $13.5 billion in 
1980 - 1982, went into equilibrium in 1984 (Table 1). But the large external 
transfer required by debt service payments resulted in a strong contraction in 
investment35 that, in turn, jeopardised the possibilities of sustained growth. 
The failure of orthodox stabilisation policies, with regard to inflation, 
reinforced the theoretical and empirical arguments of economists who 
maintained that price inertia was the fundamental element of inflationary 
dynamics in Brazil. Disinflation, it was claimed, should therefore rely on a 
heterodox shock or the introduction of an indexed currency, but under no 
circumstances only on fiscal and monetary adjustment. 
In March 1985, a civilian administration took power after 21 years of 
military rule. The Finance Minister, F. Dornelles, announced a stabilisation 
policy based, once again, on the reduction of the budget deficit. But the 
government decided simultaneously to introduce a price freeze. It was 
nonetheless a very inconsistent incomes policy: the Central Bank had to 
announce the monthly devaluation rate at the beginning of each month and the 
rule of lagged wage indexation (on past inflation) remained in force. Only the 
price of steel and fuel, effectively controlled by the government, remained 
fixed, whereas the prices of the private sector did not follow the economic 
authorities' expectations. In April, despite the announcement of a price freeze, 
the exchange rate fell by 13.4%. 
HIGH INFLATION AND THE CRUZADO PLAN IN BRAZIL 23 
This policy suffered from several errors of 'design' which were analysed in 
Part I. The price stability of fuel and steel had a beneficial impact on prices 
(essentially through production costs), but the exchange rate devaluations and 
wage indexation reflected past inflation. The inflation rate fell from 10.9% in 
the first quarter of 1985 to 7.9% in the second quarter, but the real prices of 
steel and fuel showed important reductions, and the financial situation of public 
companies deteriorated. In fact, the government tried to anchor inflation to the 
movements of public prices, a policy that produced hardly sustainable 
imbalances. 
In June, against the pressures exerted for a readjustment of the underadjusted 
prices, the government progressively liberalised the price control policy. But in 
August the situation became much more complicated: a large increase in 
agricultural prices (22.6%), due to long drought, caused a fast acceleration of 
inflation and the Finance Minister, Dornelles, was replaced by D. Funaro. The 
government adopted a more expansionary monetary policy and the nominal 
interest rate remained stable despite the acceleration of inflation. Some 
ministerial advisers were worried about the impact of financial costs on the 
inflationary dynamic: in their view the nominal interest rate should be inflation's 
fundamental anchor. 
In any case, the arrival in power of a civilian government also led to strong 
wage pressures. There were widespread demands for the reduction of the 
indexation period from six to three months. Towards the end of 1985, inflation 
was 15% per month and the political support from which the government 
benefited crumbled away. The acceleration of inflation led to even stronger 
pressures for the reduction of wage indexation periods, and the introduction of 
an endogenous time indexation wage rule linked to a trigger point inflation rate 
of 30% was discussed. The destabilising impact of these measures increased the 
fear of a hyper-inflationary explosion. In February 1986, the government 
responded to the political and economic crisis with the announcement of the 
Cruzado Plan. 
When the Cruzado Plan was announced, the conditions for the introduction 
of heterodox shock were relatively good36: the economy had expanded since 
1984, the real exchange rate was at a reasonably high level and real wages, after 
a good recovery in 1985, were at the average level of the five previous years 
(Table 1). The adjusted budget deficit was small and the state of the external 
accounts was particularly favourable. The current account of the balance of 
payments was in equilibrium, which allowed the country to service the foreign 
debt without resorting to increasing indebtedness. The international scenario was 
equally favourable with the low price of oil, of which Brazil is a large importer, 
and the devaluation of the dollar against European currencies and the yen.37 
However, the initial conditions were less favourable concerning certain key 
domestic prices, which were too low as a result of the price control policy 
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followed in 1985. This was case, for example, for the price of cars, steel and 
fuel. Therefore, there was an element of repressed inflation. Moreover, many 
large state companies, operating in the steel and fuel sectors, saw their financial 
situation deteriorate with the consequent negative effect on the public sector 
finances. 
The Cruzado Plan 
The most important measures of the stabilisation programme launched on the 
28th February 1986 are the following: 
Monetary reform. The government introduced the cruzado, a new currency 
which replaced the cruzeiro, with an exchange rate of 1,000 cruzeiros to one 
cruzado. This monetary reform, coupled with specific rules for contracts 
with unsynchronised readjustment (wages, rents) and for financial contracts 
at prefixed interest rates, was implemented to avoid the redistributive effects 
of heterodox shock. The intention of the authors was thus to launch a shock 
programme that assured distributive neutrality. 
Prices. All prices, except industrial electricity which increased 20%, were 
frozen for an indefinite length of time at their level of 27 February. The 
government also introduced a change of methodology for the creation of the 
consumer price index: the base date of the index was moved to 28 February 
to avoid 'statistical inflation' during the plan's first month. If the price index 
had continued to be calculated from weekly averages, there would have been 
inflation in March even though prices had remained fixed since 27 February. 
This inflation residual could be large in a high inflation regime, which would 
negatively affect the stabilisation plan's credibility and would have 
eventually led to calls for the adjustment of prices and wages.38 
Wages. A conversion rule of cruzeiros into cruzados was applied to wages: 
the real wage in cruzados was equal to the average real wage of the six 
preceding months (September 1985 to February 1986).39 Moreover the 
government conceded a bonus of 8% on all wages. This decision, essentially 
a political one, led to a redistribution of income towards workers in the post-
shock economy and therefore altered the initial aim of neutrality. The 
government reinforced this redistributive policy by fixing the minimum 
salary in cruzados at a level which was 15% higher than its real average 
value in cruzeiros of the six preceding months. 
A specific rule for future wage adjustments was also set: there would be an 
automatic adjustment of 60% of yearly inflation, if the rate of inflation 
should be lower than 20% (per year). But if cumulative inflation, since the 
last adjustment, exceeded 20%, wage indexation would be 100%.40 This 
wage rule did not limit the number of adjustments of 20% through the year. 
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Exchange rate. The exchange rate was fixed against the dollar at the rate of 
27 February 1986. 
Rents. In principle, the government should have adopted an identical 
conversion mechanism as the one used for wages. Nevertheless, before the 
Cruzado Plan, rents were only readjusted by 80% of past inflation, every six 
or twelve months. This partial indexation rule led to a progressive real 
reduction of the average rent. The government therefore decided to use a 
'forward-looking' rule: rents were updated to 28 February 1986, then 
deflated with an hypothetical monthly inflation rate of 14.6% (0.45% a 
day).41 Commercial rents, which were not included under the partial 
indexation mechanism, would be converted into cruzados following the rule 
of the average real level between readjustments. 
Financial contracts. For indexed financial operations (with postfixed interest 
rate), the real interest rate added to the rate of inflation became the nominal 
interest rate in cruzados. Indexed financial instruments for a period of less 
than one year were forbidden, except for savings accounts which were to be 
indexed three times a year. Financial contracts at prefixed cruzeiro rates 
were converted into cruzados with a future depreciation rate of 0.45 % a day. 
This (arbitrary) conversion rate, was based on the average inflation rates 
between December 1985 to February 1986.42 
The government did not make any precise announcement on future monetary 
and fiscal policy, but the main concern of economists was to avoid any recessive 
impact. Monetary policy should adjust to the increase of the real demand for 
money resulting from price stability. Interest rates were greatly reduced: the 
aim being to reduce the 'financial costs' of firms and to signal an expected 
reduction of inflation. A fall in interest rates also implied a reduction of the 
burden of the domestic public debt service, and low interest rates should also 
stimulate investment which had been greatly reduced with the adjustment 
policies of 1980 to 1983. The monetary policy must be passive; therefore, the 
economic authorities were planning a monetary policy following F. Lopes's 
initial heterodox shock proposition. From the beginning of the Cruzado Plan the 
government paid no attention to speculative behaviour which greatly jeopardised 
the sustainability of the stabilisation plan. Concerning fiscal policy, the authors 
of the plan considered that the adjusted deficit was compatible with stable post-
shock prices, and thus no fundamental correction was required. 
The Cruzado Plan followed the rules for heterodox shock, with monetary 
reform as an instrument designed to guarantee the distributive neutrality of the 
programme. Meanwhile, the wage policy implied a redistribution of income 
towards workers. With the introduction of the 'moving scale' at 20%, the 
government satisfied a long-standing demand of the unions and political 
opposition. This rule apparently had the aim of protecting real wages in case of 
an inflationary acceleration, but at the risk of introducing a large factor of 
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instability. Certain economists thought that this rule signalled an element of 
governmental self-discipline, showing the intention of the economic authorities 
to keep inflation at a low level. 
The commitment to maintain price stability was supposed to be strengthened 
by the announcement of the Minister of Finance that the objective of the 
government was 'zero inflation'. Several government economists were worried 
over the fixing of certain prices at too low a level, but the 'zero inflation' 
commitment prevented any corrective price adjustment for an excessively long 
period. 
The Results of the Cruzado Plan 
The analysis of the evolution of the Cruzado Plan can be divided into three 
phases: 
A state of grace and first problems: March to July 1986; 
The Cruzadinho and widespread excess demand: July to October 1986; 
The Cruzado Plan II and the end of Cruzado: November 1986 to April 1987. 
In the first phase, the government succeeded in stabilising prices, but the first 
problems of disequilibria in the goods and financial markets appeared. In the 
second phase, a situation of widespread excess demand developed, whereas in 
the third phase the government let the repressed inflation loose and an 
inflationary explosion was to herald the failure of the Cruzado Plan. 
State of grace and first problems: March to July 1986 
Despite the criticisms of the opposition, which depicted the Cruzado Plan as 'a 
strategy for unemployment', the stabilisation programme was welcomed with 
enthusiasm by the people. A general strike against the new policy had to be 
suspended due to a lack of popular support. The initial impact of the heterodox 
shock upon inflation is impressive: consumer prices, which had increased by 
12.6% in February, fell by -0.11 % in March (Table 2). In the period of April 
to July, average inflation was 1.2% a month, or an annual rate of 15.4% against 
300-400% in the pre-cruzado period. 
However, different components of the price index did not show uniform 
behaviour. The prices of clothes and transport showed larger increases, of 3-6% 
a month. In textiles, seasonal changes brought about the introduction of new 
products, and the 'new' prices could differ from the official controlled prices. 
In fact price controls induced firms to overestimate new product prices 
(overpricing) : the government sets maximum prices, thus giving an incentive 
for firms to fix their prices at higher levels and, eventually, propose price 
reductions according to market conditions. But the price index only took 
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'window' prices into account. The increase in transport sector prices was caused 
by a spurt of inflation in the second- hand car market. Demand for both new cars 
and second-hand cars was growing strongly. Moreover, the prices of new cars 
had been set at too low a level. A low current real price of new cars, with the 
expectation of possible future price readjustments, resulted in an increase in 
demand, which also showed a strong impact on the 'flexi-price' second- hand 
car market. 
On the whole, the Cruzado Plan appeared to be a huge success: inflation fell 
to levels that would have been unimaginable a few months earlier and, contrary 
to the predictions of the opposition, there was a strong expansion in economic 
activity. The President, J. Sarney, and his Finance Minister, D. Funaro, were 
at the peak of their popularity. The Cruzado Plan became the government's most 
important card in the elections to be held in November. 
Aggregate demand and production growth was fairly impressive: the retail 
sales index increased by about 40% between March and July (Table 3) and 
industrial output grew by 12.4% compared to the second quarter of the previous 
year (Table 4); the unemployment rate fell from 4.4% in February to 3.1 % in 
July (Table 5). 
Wages showed a strong and rapid increase (Table 2), due to the payment of 
bonuses and a growing number of hours worked (Table 5),which added to the 
8% bonus and the minimum wage increase implemented by the government. The 
real wage increase was greater in the more competitive markets: it reached 32% 
between February and July for independent workers. The growth of real wages 
added to the demand expansion. 
The state of grace of the Cruzado Plan would not last much longer. The 
excess demand in the car market showed the first signs of overheating of the 
economy and repressed inflation. In July, there were widespread signs of 
quantitative rationing on the car market, waiting lists, and the payment of 
'unofficial' bonuses (side payments). The quantitative rationing gradually 
extended itself to an increasing number of markets. Supply problems were 
adding to the demand boom. In certain sectors such as meat production, the 
accumulation of speculative stocks, due to the increase in expected real profits, 
led to the disappearance of meat at official prices. Problems were also being 
revealed in other markets: conflicts between the producers of final goods and 
their suppliers over the price of intermediate goods, leading to a fall in supply 
or a decline in the quality of products. 
Given the lack of statistics on 'over-pricing' or registers of waiting lists, it 
is difficult to measure the magnitude of the quantitative rationing problem. 
Table 6 shows an indirect indicator of repressed inflation: the ratio of prices of 
new cars relative to second-hand cars. In July, second-hand cars were more 
expensive than new cars by 20%. The problem of repressed inflation, restricted 
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to certain sectors in June-July, turned into a generalised problem in the third 
quarter of 1986. 
The large increase in real wages and an over-expansionary monetary policy 
were the sources of the widespread excess demand. The monetary base 
increased by 167% between March and July (Table 7) and the quantity of real 
money (Ml) showed an increase of 183% in the same period (Table 8). The 
expected process of remonetisation of the economy therefore took place: price 
stability eliminated the inflation tax on monetary assets and led to an increase in 
the demand for real cash balances. The result was a reallocation of domestic 
financial portfolios with a larger proportion of liquid assets, whether indexed or 
with a prefixed interest rate (Table 8). 
It is difficult to estimate the impact on the real demand for money of the 
change in the inflationary regime, and therefore difficult to evaluate with any 
accuracy the monetary policy. Nevertheless, the movements in the larger 
financial aggregates, as well as the foreign exchange market and the stock 
exchange index, show an excessive monetary expansion. Between February and 
July, M4 grew by 20.8%, 13% in real terms (Tables 7 and 8); there was, 
therefore, not only a substitution effect from interest-bearing (less liquid) 
domestic financial assets to domestic monetary assets, but also a growth in 
overall monetary aggregates. Very high domestic interest rates could lead to a 
fall in the demand for foreign financial assets, that could, in turn, explain the 
increase in M4, without revealing a situation incompatible with price stability. 
Yet this was not the case: the nominal interest rate was very low and the monthly 
real ex-post interest rate was close to zero (Table 9). 
For a large portion of the market, the expected real interest rate was 
probably strongly negative, which partly explains the demand 'boom' for 
consumer durables (Table 4) and the spurt of property speculation. Between 
April and July, the index of real property values increased by 62.2% (Table 9). 
On the foreign exchange market, after the favourable impact of the first few 
days of stability, the value of the dollar on the 'black market' took off. The 
difference between the free exchange rate and the commercial exchange rate 
fixed by the government went from 26% in March to 73 % in July (Table 9). The 
stock market, like the property market, also appeared to be carried by a 
'speculative bubble': in two months, March to April, the stock index rose by 
130% (Table 9). 
Several government economists were very worried by the widespread 
situation of excess demand, but the political authorities, enraptured by the initial 
success, refused any major readjustment before the November elections.43 
Moreover, a large proportion of the government's economic advisors wrongly 
judged the situation to be favourable: they believed that there were a few 
localised problems of excess demand, but that the large growth of investment in 
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progress would in the end allow an increase in production capacity, and 
therefore increase growth. Such a rationale dangerously ignored the role of 
expectations in the demand decisions of consumers and in the supply - net of 
stocks - of producers. The error was repeated in their refusal to allow a 
domestic interest rate increase which, following this train of thought, would 
imply an increase in financial costs, an increase in inflationary expectations, and 
a contraction of investment which should balance the goods market. In fact, the 
problem was such that, given the inflation expectations of the private sector, too 
low interest rates were leading to a destabilising demand 'boom' in the goods 
and financial assets markets. 
The Cruzadinho and widespread excess demand: August 1986 to October 1986. 
On 24 July the government announced a new mini-package of fiscal adjustment 
measures, but this attempt to reduce demand was far from being enough to 
influence the run of events. A system of 'forced savings' was adopted increasing 
taxes on new cars and on fuels. The income from such taxes would be 
reimbursed to the taxpayers after three years. These indirect taxes were created 
under the cover of a scheme of forced savings which would justify the later 
exclusion of these price increases from the consumer price index. These fiscal 
measures were clearly insufficient to eliminate the excess demand for goods, 
and were particularly useless in counteracting foreign exchange and property 
market speculation. 
In any case, the continuous manipulation of the price index risked producing 
a credibility loss for the index adjusted savings accounts, because it could 
underestimate inflation.44 Under these conditions, an expectation of an 
acceleration of inflation would lead to a substitution effect from domestic 
financial assets - indexed and non-indexed - to foreign assets: it would thus 
result in extra demand pressure on the foreign exchange market. In the presence 
of a 'good' domestic indexed asset, the flight from non-indexed monetary assets 
would be partly absorbed by indexed accounts and thus would limit the negative 
impact on the free market in foreign exchange. 
Although in July the government was perhaps still in a position to avoid the 
disintegration of the stabilisation programme, a different fiscal policy and a 
major monetary adjustment would have been necessary. For example, an 
increase in direct taxes could have reduced disposable income without leading 
to widespread price increases. Certainly those prices which were frozen at too 
low a level on 27 February should have been adjusted. Had these prices been 
increased much earlier, the first signs of quantitative rationing would have been 
avoided. 
An increase in the nominal interest rate would also have been necessary to 
counteract the excessive demand for foreign exchange and property speculation 
that would in time lead to an increase in rents. However, when inflationar
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expectations are very unstable and the Central Bank follows a passive discount 
policy, a large increase in expected inflation can lead to an expansion in the 
demand for credit despite a rise in the nominal interest rate. In such an 
environment, the rationing of credit could therefore become a very effective 
post-stabilisation monetary instrument. 
In August, the economy showed the first signs of a 'contamination effect': 
the progressive extension of quantitative rationing raised the probability, in 
consumers' perception, that non-rationed markets would in turn be affected. A 
precautionary purchasing 'boom' resulted, effectively bringing this about in 
non-rationed markets. Moreover, the price increases decided upon by the 
government in July risked signalling to the private sector that subsequent 
adjustments could take place in other markets. An intertemporal consumption 
substitution effect took place, strengthening the destabilising impact of the 
contamination effect. 
In the period from August to October, 'official' inflation slightly increased 
to reach a monthly rate of 1.8% against a rate of 1.2% in the preceding period. 
This figure, however, masked the payment of unofficial premiums added to 
official prices which was then a normal practice, as well as introducing new 
products (brands) and a fall in quality of goods already for sale. The expectation 
of price liberalisation brought about not only an increase in consumers' demand, 
but also an increase in firms' stocks, whose expected real interest rate fell. The 
net supply to the market decreased and the degree of excess demand increased. 
Also, the presence of bottlenecks in intermediate goods production and price 
conflicts with suppliers limited many firms' production to a level beneath their 
productive capacity.45 
Table 6 shows that, despite the 30% price increase for new cars in August, 
the price of second-hand cars was still higher a month later. Real wages 
increased continuously. Property speculation appeared to be limitless: the real 
value index rose by 76% between July and October, 186% since the beginning 
of the Cruzado Plan. By this point, the stock exchange was already predicting 
the future economic events and the stock exchange index fell by 40% (July-
October) to the pre-Cruzado Plan levels of the second quarter of 1985 (Table 9). 
On the exchange rate market, the expectation of an inflationary acceleration 
and the adjustment of the commercial exchange rate that would result, led to a 
large devaluation of the 'free' rate of exchange. The premium of the dollar price 
on the black market reached 100% in October (Table 9). The rapid erosion of 
the balance of payments from the beginning of September intensified the 
expectation of a large adjustment of the commercial exchange rate: the surplus 
of the balance of trade was halved in September and went into deficit in October 
(Table 10). The problems of supply lead to a reduction in exports and an 
expectation of a devaluation of the official exchange rate induced firms to 
postpone the settlement of payment for exports in foreign exchange and to 
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increase imports. Moreover, the large premium on the price of the dollar on the 
black market encouraged the under invoicing of exports and the over-invoicing 
of imports, inducing a large deterioration of the external accounts. 
In the third quarter of 1986, it was already obvious that not only was the 
monetary policy very expansionist, but also that the fiscal policy was far from 
being neutral. Price stability increased the real revenue of the Treasury, but the 
rise in public spending widened the budget deficit (Table 11). 
Despite the gradual disintegration of the Cruzado Plan, the government took 
no action, waiting instead for November's elections. Economic policy during 
this period was limited to a battle of wills between the government and cattle-
breeders, the former extremely concerned over the availability of meat supplies 
that could not be found at the official price. In October, the government 
announced a devaluation of the official exchange rate of 1.8%, a measure which 
only increased the confusion on the markets due to the lack of precise rules for 
future economic policy. 
Cruzado II and the end of the Cruzado Plan: November 1986-April 1987 
On 21 November, a week after the elections in which the ruling coalition 
partners were largely dominant, the government announced Cruzado Plan II: a 
large fiscal adjustment and a public price shock which would result in an 
inflationary explosion. The stated aim of the government was to obtain an 
increase in public sector incomes equivalent to 4% of GDP through an additional 
increase in indirect taxes and large adjustments of state companies' prices. To 
quote a few examples, the price of petrol rose by 60%, telephone rates by 35 %, 
milk by 100% and new cars by 80%. 
During November and December, the government adjusted the official 
exchange rate by mini-devaluations that were lower than the rate of inflation. 
The ensuing price adjustments eliminated excess demand in the goods market 
and freed the repressed inflation. The government made no announcement about 
the future indexation rules for public prices, neither for the exchange rate nor 
for those prices of the private sector that were still controlled. A climate of great 
uncertainty prevailed in the business community: at the end of the year the 
premium of the dollar on the black market stood at around 100%.46 
Consumer prices increased by 3.3% in November and by 7.3% in 
December. The cumulative inflation since 27 February exceeded 20% and 
under the established wage rule there had to be an automatic adjustment of 
wages, which occurred at the end of January. A fast acceleration of inflation and 
a price-wage spiral were set off: prices increased by 16% a month in January 
and February 1987. 
The deterioration of the balance of trade and the loss of foreign exchange 
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reserves forced the government to declare a moratorium on the foreign debt 
service. But this decision had a strong political rationale: the government was 
trying to regain the political consensus and public support which had evaporated 
with the failure of the Cruzado Plan. 
In February, the economic authorities decided to simultaneously remove 
price controls and introduce a new monthly indexed financial asset. One year 
after the launch of the Cruzado Plan, inflation had increased even further and 
the 'moving scale' wage rule led to an even greater price instability. 
The acceleration of inflation provoked a large fall of the real wage, which 
by May 1987 returned to the pre-Cruzado Plan level: a fall of 15 to 40%, 
depending on the sector, since November 1986 (Table 12). The real wage 
reduction brought about a contraction in consumption demand in the first few 
months of 1987. 
The inflationary push from the Cruzado Plan II also triggered a process of 
rapid demonetisation of the economy. The role of the inflationary memory was 
then obvious. In the first half of 1987, real money balances (Ml) fell by 60% 
and a substitution effect towards indexed domestic assets was the result. The 
M1/M4 ratio quickly found its pre-Cruzado Plan level (Table 8). From 
November onwards, nominal interest rates were on the rise, to reach 15-25% 
a month, by the first half of 1987 (Table 9). 
The inflationary explosion, therefore, validated the speculative behaviour of 
the goods market and of financial assets. The 'speculative bubble' of the 
property market burst between October 1986 and January 1987: the real price 
fell by 50% (Table 9). The stock-exchange collapsed; the stock index fell 50% 
in real terms, 80% compared to its level at the beginning of the Cruzado Plan 
(Table 9). In the first few months of 1987, the government accelerated the 
devaluation of the cruzado and followed an implicit passive crawling peg rule 
to maintain competitiveness. The fulfilment of devaluation expectations and the 
increase in domestic interest rates resulted in a drop of the black market dollar 
premium which fell to 10-30%. In April, the expectation of a probable return 
to price controls and rumours of a 'new Cruzado' triggered preventive price 
increases by private firms and inflation reached 20%. In April, D. Funaro, 
Finance Minister during the Cruzado Plan, left the ministry. 
The Lessons to be Drawn from the Cruzado Plan 
The experience of the Cruzado Plan shows that a heterodox shock policy brings 
about an abrupt fall in the inflation rate without major adjustment costs in terms 
of production or employment. The initial impact of this stabilisation strategy is 
therefore very favourable: this is the result of the coordination effect of an active 
incomes policy. 
HIGH INFLATION AND THE CRUZADO PLAN IN BRAZIL 33 
The sustainability of a stable price regime depends greatly upon initial 
conditions: the relative fixed prices at the time of the shock, the initial budget 
deficit, and the current account balance as well as foreign exchange reserves at 
the start of the plan. If the government faces an excessive external transfer, 
capital flows being scarce, a 'too low' real wage may result, imposing a latent 
distributive conflict and jeopardising stability. Unfavourable initial conditions 
can lead to a rapid loss of credibility of the programme and destabilising 
expectations in the private sector. In certain cases, it may be appropriate to 
allow an over-adjustment of public prices or of the exchange rates in the period 
before the shock, which would in turn allow the absorption of post-shock 
residual inflation without necessarily setting off expectations of revisions of 
these prices. 
In the period following price stabilisation, one would expect a process of 
remonetisation and a reversal of the fiscal lag leading to an improvement in real 
tax collection. Nevertheless, initially it is sensible to fix nominal interest rates 
at a rather high level to penalise portfolio shifts towards foreign currency as well 
as property market speculation. Furthermore, the credibility of the programme 
will be enhanced if higher domestic interest rates induce an increase in foreign 
reserves or a decrease of the black market (free exchange rate) premium if a 
regime of exchange rate controls prevails. Moreover, high interest rates will 
discourage the accumulation of stocks in the goods market. A policy of credit 
rationing and freely adjusting interest rates may be the appropriate instruments 
when the setting of the discount rate by the Central Bank is shown to be 
unsatisfactory. 
From the beginning of the plan the government must implement a fiscal and 
monetary policy consistent with price stability. The uncertainty regarding the net 
effect of an inflationary regime change on aggregate demand requires a very 
flexible monetary and fiscal policy. An incompatible demand policy can lead to 
repressed inflation. The government must show a determined response to the 
first signs of quantitative rationing, or it will risk seeing a 'contamination effect' 
develop, thus inducing an explosive and generalised excess demand syndrome. 
In turn, the collapse of the stabilisation programme would probably follow 
rather soon. 
The adjustment rules for wages must help to strengthen the anti-inflation 
consensus. A trigger indexation rule such as the one implemented during the 
Cruzado Plan introduces a strongly destabilising element. This non-linear 
indexation rule for wages can lead to a preference for higher inflation (Winograd 
and Verdier, 1989). 
The shift in the inflationary regime resulting from the heterodox shock is 
very fragile. The abrupt fall in the inflation rate does not produce an 
instantaneous disappearance of the 'inflationary memory'. A 'bad signal' could 
rapidly trigger destabilising behaviour among relevant economic agents. 
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In the event of initial success in the stabilisation programme, the government 
must gradually remove the price controls on the most competitive sectors. There 
must be in-depth analysis of the optimal rules for a non-inflationary deregulation 
of prices and wages. Consistent trade liberalisation may enhance a successful 
removal of the price controls. The Cruzado Plan did not survive long enough to 
face such a problem. 
The political constraints that may affect the course of the heterodox shock 
programme must be considered. The initial success of the plan gave the political 
authorities the impression that the 'state of the world' had effectively changed 
for ever. The excessive enthusiasm encouraged a total disregard for the fragility 
of the price stability of the new regime. The refusal of any adjustment in the 
programme, which could have reduced the short-term popularity of the 
incumbent politicians, became an insurmountable problem for the survival of the 
stabilisation plan. 
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Notes 
1. For an analysis of the origins and the development of the 1985 Austral Plan 
in Argentina, see C.D. Winograd (1985a), D. Heymann (1986), G. Rosenwurcel 
(1986) and R. Frenkel and J.M. Fanelli (1987); for a comparative analysis of the 
case of Israel, see the study by M. Bruno (1986), R. Dornbusch and M.H. 
Simonsen (1987). 
2. For a recent review of the literature on the theory of inflation, see H. Frisch 
(1983). 
3. See R. Gordon (1982) for a study on the USA. 
4. The relationship between inflation and variability of relative prices has been 
analysed by A. Cukierman (1983, 1984) and O. Kacef (1986). 
5.In several countries the legal theory of unpredictable eventualities allows 
renegotiation of contracts, but the ensuing process is long and costly. 
6. The relationship between inflation and real wages is analysed in detail in T. 
Verdier and C. D. Winograd (1988). 
7. See G. Bry (1960). 
8. On this subject, see R. Frenkel (1979). 
9. The assumption here is that the mark-up is pro-cyclical; however, the 
empirical evidence is ambiguous. For the case of Brazil, see J. Camargo and E. 
Landau (1984) and F. Modiano (1985a). 
10. The effect of rotation of manpower may permit firms to counteract salary 
indexation. From this perspective, excess demand in the labour market might 
influence the dynamic of wage settlements. Nevertheless, rotation is not expected 
to have a very significant effect, especially in the modern industrial sector. 
11. The introduction of an imported good that is competitive with the I good 
does not alter the essential analysis. In the case of Brazil, the structure of 
customs protection excluded this type of good at the time of the Cruzado Plan. 
12. The intermediate good could be the one that is exchangeable, i.e. T. The 
results would remain essentially unchanged, but the model would be reduced to 
four goods. 
13. An alternative and more realistic specification of the industrial price would 
introduce an asymmetry in the adjustment of the margin of benefit. If, in the face 
of excess demand, there is no upper limit to the mark-up, there is nevertheless 
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a lower limit in case of excess supply (with Qd T>0). 
14. For a detailed analysis of these experiments, see C. D. Winograd (1988). 
15. For a detailed theoretical analysis, see T. Verdier and C.D. Winograd 
(1988). 
16. Described in the literature as the Olivera-Tanzi effect, since they 
rediscovered it. See F. Graham (1928), C. Bresciani-Turroni (1937), J. Olivera 
(1967), V. Tanzi (1977) and G.H.B. Franco (1986). 
17. C. Bresciani-Turroni (1937). 
18. For a comparative analysis of the experience of hyperinflation and 
stabilisation in Germany in the 1920s and the chronic 'Latin' inflationary 
episodes, see C.D.Winograd (1985a). 
19. During the negotiations with the IMF the economic authorities in Brazil 
defended the use of inflation-adjusted budget deficits, while the IMF imposed the 
concept of current account deficit. The first measure is undoubtedly more precise 
since it does not vary with variations in rates of inflation; i.e. it excludes the 
direct effect of inflation (as distinct from other real budgetary effects caused by 
variations in rates of inflation such as the effect of fiscal delay). 
20. Estimates of deficit adjusted by inflation have been made for Brazil by D.D. 
Carneiro (1986a, 1986b). 
21. Excluding, of course, other effects that may be produced at the time of price 
stabilisation. 
22. This problem is developed in Winograd (1985a, 1985b). 
23. See P. Arida (1982), R. Macedo (1983), F. Lopes (1984b, 1986b) and C.D. 
Winograd and T. Verdier (1989). For a macroeconomic analysis of the impact 
of wage indexation, see J. Gray (1976), S. Fischer (1977) and F. Modigliani and 
Padoa-Schioppa (1978). 
24. For a detailed description of this scheme of resynchronisation of 
readjustments of nominal wages, see E. Modiano (1985c, 1986). 
25. This argument can be extended to the case of hyperinflation. See C.D. 
Winograd (1985a). 
26. The name Cruzado, later used to designate the new currency, appears for the 
first time in an article by F. Lopes (1986). 
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27. F. Lopes (1984a). 
28. Lopes developed this idea, but it is found also in E. Modiano (1986a) and P. 
Arida and A. Lara Resende (1984). 
29. See A. Lara Resende (1984 and P. Arida and A. Lara Resende (1984). 
30. In 1946, in conditions of very high inflation, the Hungarian administration 
introduced an indexed currency: the result of this experiment was an inflationary 
explosion. See W.A. Bomberger and G.E. Makinen (1980). 
31. The authors of the programme are aware of this: A. Lara Resende (1984) 
argues that the success of the IM programme requires the conversion of contracts 
to be done according to the rules laid down. So the insistence on the (apparently) 
voluntary nature of the programme seems to have a rhetorical element. 
32. In C.D. Winograd (1985a) it is shown that the costs of adjustment associated 
with a policy of monetary control may become negligible when the economy 
reaches an explosive hyperinflation phase. 
33. For a detailed analysis of the period 1979-1985, see E. Bacha (1983), D.D. 
Carneiro (1987) and J. Gomez Lorenzo (1987). 
34. The public debt policy during this period has been analysed in detail by L. 
Passos Domingues (1986). For a study on the financing of the public sector, cf. 
R. Werneck (1986). 
35. The impact of orthodox adjustment in response to the external sector 
imbalance is similar in Brazil and in Argentina. However, Argentina was not 
able to balance the current account; see J.M. Fanelli, R. Frenkel and C.D. 
Winograd (1987), and C.D. Winograd (1988). 
36. Several authors consider that the initial conditions were very good: according 
to E. Modiano (1987), 'more than satisfactory'. We shall see that this statement 
has to be moderated. 
37. Fixing the rates of change against the dollar therefore implied a devaluation 
of the cruzeiro against the European currencies and the yen (and the currencies 
linked to these). 
38. This phenomenon of statistical post-shock inflation was seen to be very 
important in Argentina at the time of the Austral Plan in 1985. See J.M. Fanelli 
and R. Frenkel (1987). 
39. E. Modiano (1897) gives a detailed explanation of the mechanism of 
conversion. 
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40. A preliminary version of the decree law had determined that there would 
be free negotiations without automatic indexation. It is in a second version that 
this indexation rule was introduced. 
41. The factor of conversion is 0.73 for rents readjusted every six months and 
0.53 for rents readjusted annually. See E. Modiano (1987). 
42. At the time of the Austral Plan in Argentina (June 1985) a similar conversion 
rule had been used for fixed rate financial contracts. In Argentina the length of 
the contracts was generally a month, which made the application of a conversion 
rate linked to the inflation of the last pre-shock month less arbitrary. In Brazil, 
on the other hand, in February 1986 there were financial contracts with a longer 
term with different expected inflation rates according to the month of negotiation 
of the contract. Certain transfers of wealth, more significant than in Argentina, 
would therefore result, in particular for the oldest contracts (e.g., ten months pre-
Cruzado), which included a lower anticipated rate of inflation. 
43.D.D. Carneiro (1987) attributes crucial importance to this effect of political 
'paralysis'. 
44. I thank Andre Urani for the suggestion that this problem might exist. 
45. In the automobile sector, production diminished in the third quarter, in spite 
of the strong expansion of demand (see Table 3). 
46. For analyses of the Cruzado Plan in the course of implementation, see P. 
Bodin (1986) and G.H.B. Franco (1986b). 
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Table 1 
Macroeconomic Indicators 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Consumer Price 
Inflation (%) 
99.3 95.5 104.8 164.0 215.3 242.2 22.2 
GDP Growth Rate (%) 9.1 -3.4 0.9 -2.5 5.7 8.3 8.2 
GDP Per Capita 
Index1 100.0 94.7 93.6 88.9 91.9 97.5 103.1 
Ratio 
Consumption/GDP (%) 79.3 79.2 80.7 82.9 78.9 78.3 79.0 
Ratio 
Investment/GDP (%) 22.9 21.1 20.0 14.7 15.5 16.7 18.5 
Ratio Exports/GDP (%) 8.9 9.4 7.9 11.2 13.4 11.9 8.5 
Ratio Imports/GDP (%) 11.1 9.3 8.6 8.9 7.8 6.9 6.0 
Real Exchange Rate2 96.9 89.7 91.8 111.3 108.6 110.5 100.0 
Real Wage2 85.9 89.9 91.4 77.4 75.6 85.7 100.0 
Balance of Trade3 
Exports3 
Imports3 
-2.8 
20.1 
22.9 
1.2 
23.3 
22.1 
0.8 
20.2 
19.4 
6.5 
21.9 
15.4 
13.1 
27.0 
13.9 
12.5 
25.6 
13.1 
8.3 
22.4 
14.0 
Current Account 
Balance3 -12.8 -11.7 -16.3 -6.3 0.0 -0.2 -4.5 
Gross Nominal 
Foreign Debt3 63.9 71.9 83.3 91.6 102.0 105.1 111.0 
Index1 100.0 112.6 130.4 143.5 159.8 164.7 173.9 
Gross Foreign 
Debt - Index of 
Real Value1 100.0 102.1 111.4 118.7 126.8 126.2 130.8 
Ratio Exports/Net 
Foreign Debt (%) 35.3 36.1 26.5 25.2 30.0 27.4 21.5 
Ratio Foreign Debt 
Interest/ Exports (%) 31.4 39.3 56.3 43.6 37.8 40.6 34.0 
Nominal Budget 
Deficit of the Public 
Sector (%) 4 4.3 5.8 7.1 7.5 9.3 ng ng 
Adjusted Budget 
Deficit of the Public 
Sector (%) 4 1.9 3.2 3.1 0.1 2.2 4.3 3.7 
1 Base index 1980 = 100 
2 Base index 1986 = 100 
3 In billions of current dollars 
4 Estimates by D. D. Carneiro (1986a) and Brasil Economica, Banco Central do Brasil (1987) 
ng - not given in source 
Sources: Developed from data of the Banco Central do Brasil, IBGE, Conjuntura Econdmica, 
FGV and Macroeconomica. 


Table 3 
Demand Indicators 
General Sales 
Indicator1 (%) 
Cement 
Production 
In thousand Rate of 
of tonnes Change2 (%) 
1983 -11.7 20,586 -19.1 
1984 -11.1 19,488 -5.3 
1985 9.1 20,612 5.8 
1986 39.4 25,257 23.8 
1985: 
January -2.9 1,456 -5.9 
February -11.3 1,450 -3.1 
March 12.4 1,667 7.9 
April -3.9 1,389 -6.3 
May 22.5 1,604 -9.7 
June 8.8 1,632 16.2 
July 6.0 1,731 3.6 
August 17.5 1,949 12.6 
September 0.7 1,882 15.5 
October 21.1 2,003 11.1 
November 19.6 1,963 9.7 
December 18.2 1,886 16.8 
1986: 
January 19.6 1,789 22.9 
February 25.7 1,599 10.3 
March 14.5 1,661 -0.4 
April 49.3 1,841 32.5 
May 34.4 2,150 34.0 
June 27.6 2,046 25.4 
July 55.5 2,241 29.5 
August 43.3 2,361 21.1 
September 34.7 2,322 23.4 
October 60.7 2,480 23.8 
November 62.7 2,404 22.5 
December 44.1 2,363 25.3 
1987: 
January n.a 2,331 30.3 
February n.a 2,097 31.1 
March n.a 1,910 15.0 
April n.a 1,970 7.0 
May n.a 2,094 -2.5 
June n.a 1,802 -11.9 
July n.a 2,043 -8.8 
1 Sao Paulo. Change compared to the same time the previous year (%) 
2 Change compared to the same time the previous year (%) 
n.a. No data available 
Motor Vehicles Television Sets 
Production Sales Sales 
In Units Rate of In Units Rate of In units Rate of 
Change2 Change2 Change2 
895,997 4.2 908,865 5.5 1,213 -18.0 
865,037 -3.5 853,619 -6.1 1,240 2.2 
967,614 11.9 973,045 14.0 1,542 24.4 
1,056,263 9.2 1,013,080 4.1 2,205 43.0 
78,676 26.0 74,574 28.8 
70,674 -4.2 73,062 8.5 
84,407 21.8 87,529 27.5 269 8.9 
37,024 -34.3 35,585 -49.5 
48,654 -39.8 53,564 -30.4 
70,415 -1.2 65,961 11.8 392 44.6 
99,953 41.5 96,884 47.7 
94,391 11.0 94,521 16.3 
96,625 40.5 100,791 37.9 444 32.9 
112,612 44.0 109,925 36.6 
99,041 15.5 98,473 19.8 
75,155 19.71 82,176 16.4 437 12.6 
80,248 2.0 67,545 -9.4 
84,901 20.1 86,013 17.8 
99,384 17.7 101,307 15.7 325 20.8 
102,467 176.8 99,532 179.7 
102,450 110.6 104,013 94.2 
94,400 34.0 94,852 43.8 722 84.2 
87,321 -12.5 90,371 -6.7 
80,118 -15.1 79,848 -15.5 
103,068 6.7 87,334 -13.4 549 23.6 
92,952 -17.5 78,932 -28.2 
66,439 -32.9 40,481 -58.9 
62,515 -16.8 82,852 0.8 609 39.4 
72,739 -9.4 55,514 -17.8 
68,152 -19.7 71,836 -16.5 
66,050 -33.5 62,559 -38.2 439 35.1 
84,274 -17.8 90,166 -9.4 
82,550 -19.4 82,803 -20.4 
85,196 -9.8 75,815 -20.1 393 -45.6 
79,794 -8.6 90,071 -0.3 
Source: Developed from Conjuntura Econdmica data. 
Table 4 
Industrial Production by Sectors. Base mid-1985 = 100 
Non-durable 
Capital Intermediate Consumer Consumer 
goods goods Durables goods Total 
1980 139.8 94.7 116.3 92.6 101.7 
1981 112.6 84.2 87.3 93.6 91.3 
1982 95.9 86.6 94.3 95.6 91.3 
1983 77.5 84.5 93.5 90.9 86.6 
1984 86.3 89.7 80.2 88.4 88.9 
1985 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1986 121.7 108.5 120.4 108.9 111.2 
1985 
January 91.6 91.8 88.7 89.9 90.9 
February 84.5 85.3 82.8 82.0 84.0 
March 99.2 95.3 96.7 89.6 93.9 
April 82.4 86.7 65.8 86.7 84.4 
May 91.0 97.5 80.0 97.4 95.2 
June 93.9 100.0 90.5 96.7 ' 98.2 
July 107.3 107.6 113.4 109.2 108.4 
August 109.3 110.0 110.5 110.7 110.5 
September 111.5 107.0 120.1 106.3 108.5 
October 119.2 115.6 134.5 119.8 118.6 
November 109.9 103.9 123.3 109.6 107.9 
December 99.6 98.9 93.8 101.5 99.2 
1986: 
January 104.3 100.5 104.9 102.1 101.6 
February 103.1 93.7 108.0 92.5 95.5 
March 107.6 97.3 118.1 90.3 97.7 
April 119.1 98.9 122.0 96.0 101.8 
May 115.5 103.4 131.2 102.8 106.2 
June 131.1 108.5 128.0 107.4 112.4 
July 132.0 116.4 117.7 122.7 121.5 
August 127.5 117.1 119.4 118.4 120.5 
September 138.4 121.5 141.4 121.8 126.9 
October 143.0 126.8 141.9 129.1 132.5 
November 129.3 112.1 117.9 117.0 111.4 
December 109.2 105.4 94.5 106.7 106.4 
1987: 
January 113.6 106.9 106.4 106.7 108.1 
February 116.7 13.07 116.2 105.5 107.4 
March 122.5 109.5 115.8 107.1 111.6 
April 122.9 107.6 120.5 105.3 110.5 
May 122.6 109.2 117.3 107.4 111.8 
June 122.8 111.6 118.7 109.5 114.7 
July 121.3 112.9 87.9 112.8 114.0 
August 112.3 113.0 108.8 112.7 114.7 
September 121.2 116.2 124.2 119.0 119.9 
October 125.5 119.4 126.9 120.6 123.3 
Source: Developed from IBGE data 
Table 5 
Industrial Unemployment and Employment 
Rate of Unemployment (%)' Employees in Hours worked 
Sao Paulo in Sao Paulo 
Average2 Sao Paulo Industry3 Industry4 
1980 6.42 5.63 113.2 113.8 
1981 7.91 7.27 105.4 99.8 
1982 6.18 5.85 100.2 93.8 
1983 6.70 6.80 92.4 84.5 
1984 7.12 6.78 92.2 87.8 
1985 5.25 5.03 100.0 100.0 
1986 3.58 3.34 110.0 111.7 
1985: 
January 6.31 6.02 96.4 92.6 
February 6.12 5.97 97.4 91.4 
March 6.48 6.16 98.2 98.7 
April 6.08 6.00 98.6 92.2 
May 5.93 5.66 98.8 98.0 
June 5.63 5.56 99.1 97.5 
July 5.35 5.16 99.8 103.9 
August 5.03 4.82 100.6 105.1 
September 4.77 4.52 101.7 104.0 
October 4.28 4.10 102.7 110.2 
November 3.90 3.56 103.4 105.5 
December 3.15 2.70 103.8 100.3 
1986: 
January 4.18 4.09 105.2 103.9 
February 4.40 4.40 106.5 101.8 
March 4.39 4.19 107.4 107.2 
April 4.17 4.06 107.8 108.6 
May 4.08 3.73 108.3 109.5 
June 3.76 3.37 109.5 110.4 
July 3.60 3.09 110.7 115.8 
August 3.50 3.20 111.6 115.8 
September 3.23 2.93 112.8 118.9 
October 2.98 2.89 113.3 122.4 
November 2.64 2.43 113.6 115.2 
December 2.16 1.75 113.1 110.9 
1987: 
January 3.19 3.25 113.6 112.1 
February 3.38 3.12 114.7 110.9 
March 3.28 3.12 114.6 115.7 
April 3.39 3.46 114.6 114.0 
May 3.97 3.78 114.5 115.8 
June 4.43 4.45 112.8 114.4 
July 4.47 4.57 111.4 112.9 
August 4.22 4.63 110.3 110.7 
September 4.03 3.95 110.2 110.9 
1 From May 1982, the calculation method was changed. 
2 Including the metropolitan regions of Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre 
3 and 4 FIESP indicator base mid-1985 = 100 
Source: Developed from IBGE and Conjuntura Econdmica data. 
Table 6 
Indicators of Suppressed Inflation 
Ratio of Second-Hand Car Prices to New Car Prices 
Selected Models Price Ratios World 
(Second Hand/New)1 Price Index World Price 
of New Cars Index 
Monthly Ratio 
Fiat Uno CS Volkswagon Golf S Rate of Secondhand/New 
Change (%) April 1986=100 
1986: 
April 95.8 105.8 0.0 100.0 
May 95.1 106.5 0.0 104.0 
June 105.1 116.4 0.0 110.5 
July 115.4 130.4 0.0 121.2 
August 85.1 105.3 33.0 96.9 
September 87.3 112.3 0.0 102.2 
October 91.0 116.5 0.0 107.5 
November 62.9 50.1 10.5 103.9 
December 81.0 68.9 82.0 70.4 
1987: 
January 107.1 88.5 0.0 81.0 
February 107.6 89.9 0.0 87.6 
March 80.8 74.5 9.7 77.2 
April 64.7 61.2 24.3 56.8 
1 Nominal Cruzado Price Ratios. The price of new cars includes 'the refundable tax' that was 
introduced in August 1986 
Source: Developed from data from R. L. Loma Vanna (1988) and Fiat do Brasil. 
Table 7 
Monetary Aggregates (Monthly Rate of Change %) 
Monetary Base M,1 M22 M33 M44 
1980* 56.9 70.6 66.2 72.6 68.7 
1981a 69.9 87.7 135.3 140.7 140.5 
1982a 86.8 66.7 91.9 104.7 110.8 
1983a 79.8 97.4 96.5 141.9 150.5 
1984a 264.1 201.9 358.6 288.8 292.7 
1985a 257.3 304.3 332.0 310.4 303.9 
1986a 293.5 306.7 119.9 51.6 94.8 
1985 b: 
January 4.3 -10.0 7.8 10.3 11.8 
February 13.6 12.8 10.6 12.4 12.0 
March -4.3 10.2 13.8 11.7 11.8 
April 1.2 10.7 16.9 15.4 13.8 
May 13.2 8.4 16.7 13.3 13.2 
June 7.9 19.0 15.9 13.5 13.9 
July 10.1 11.0 16.0 12.0 11.4 
August 14.0 14.1 13.0 9.7 10.1 
September 15.1 16.0 10.6 11.4 10.3 
October 4.1 3.8 13.0 12.3 12.1 
November 19.7 24.3 12.4 11.6 10.6 
December 41.6 33.4 16.1 16.5 17.2 
1986 b: 
January 1.0 -8.9 6.7 12.3 12.4 
February 12.2 14.1 13.4 15.1 16.4 
March 35.9 80.1 29.4 15.8 12.2 
April 35.4 19.4 6.4 2.3 1.0 
May 15.0 15.1 6.4 4.3 2.8 
June 10.6 15.9 4.9 4.1 3.3 
July 14.1 -0.2 -1.6 -0.5 0.4 
August 6.0 6.8 4.0 3.3 5.2 
September 2.8 5.7 4.1 4.1 5.5 
October 5.2 7.2 0.9 1.0 3.4 
November 9.4 4.7 0.1 0.2 2.0 
December 3.7 7.9 9.8 8.1 5.0 
1987 h: 
January -3.6 -22.0 -5.1 -0.2 5.3 
February -4.7 6.0 14.8 18.1 16.3 
March 3.0 10.6 12.9 17.0 12.4 
April 10.5 -14.4 6.5 11.0 11.2 
May -1.3 0.5 26.2 26.1 24.6 
June -7.9 32.7 20.5 22.3 18.9 
July 28.8 9.5 10.3 13.5 14.3 
August 23.9 8.2 5.4 5.8 4.7 
September 19.8 10.6 10.7 9.3 7.3 
a Rate of change over 12 months, in December 
b Monthly rate of change at the end of the period 
1 M,: Notes and coins + current accounts 
2 M2: M, + Public debt securities excluding Central Bank 
3 M3: M2 4- Savings accounts 
4 M4: M3 + Time deposits 
Source: Developed from data from Banco Central do Brazil. 
Table 8 
Monetary Aggregates (in real terms). Base Mid-1985=100 
M,1 M22 M33 M44 M,/M4 
1980a 187.5 72.7 63.5 58.5 40.9 
1981a 183.3 88.6 78.4 73.4 31.9 
1982a 150.0 84.1 79.7 76.6 25.0 
1983a 108.3 59.0 70.3 69.1 20.0 
1984a 108.3 84.1 87.8 88.3 15.7 
1985a 125.0 111.4 105.4 104.3 15.3 
1986a 316.7 154.5 129.7 127.7 31.7 
1985: 
January 83.3 79.5 86.5 88.3 12.0 
February 83.3 79.5 87.8 88.3 12.0 
March 83.3 81.8 89.2 90.4 11.8 
April 83.3 88.6 94.6 94.7 11.2 
May 91.7 97.7 100.0 100.0 11.7 
June 100.0 104.5 104.1 105.3 12.1 
July 100.0 109.1 106.8 106.4 12.0 
August 100.0 111.4 104.1 104.3 12.2 
September 108.3 111.4 105.4 105.3 13.1 
October 100.0 113.6 105.4 106.4 12.0 
November 108.3 111.4 105.4 103.2 13.4 
December 125.0 111.4 105.4 104.3 15.3 
1986: 
January 100.0 104.5 91.9 91.5 14.0 
February 100.0 104.5 105.4 106.4 12.2 
March 175.0 131.8 118.9 114.9 19.4 
April 208.3 138.6 121.6 116.0 22.9 
May 233.3 147.7 125.7 118.1 25.2 
June 275.0 152.3 128.4 120.2 29.2 
July 266.7 150.0 127.0 120.2 28.3 
August 283.3 152.3 129.7 124.5 29.1 
September 291.7 156.8 133.8 129.8 28.7 
October 316.7 156.8 133.8 133.0 30.4 
November 316.7 152.3 128.4 130.9 30.9 
December 316.7 154.5 129.7 127.7 31.7 
1987: 
January 208.3 125.0 110.8 114.9 23.1 
February 200.0 127.3 114.9 118.1 21.6 
March 191.7 125.0 117.6 116.0 21.1 
April 133.3 111.4 108.1 106.4 16.0 
May 108.3 113.6 110.8 107.4 12.9 
June 125.0 111.4 110.8 105.3 15.2 
July 116.7 113.6 114.9 109.6 13.6 
August 125.0 113.6 116.2 109.6 14.6 
September 125.0 115.9 117.6 109.6 14.6 
October 125.0 120.5 118.9 108.5 14.7 
a December 
' M, = notes and coins + current accounts 
2 M2 = Ml + Public debt securities excluding Central Bank 
3 M3 = M2 + Savings accounts 
4 M4 = M3 + Tims deposits 
Deflated by the consumer price index 
Source: Developed from data from Banco Central do Brazil. 


Table 10 
Balance of Trade 
Exports and Imports - Monthly data (in millions of dollars) 
Raw 
Materials 
EXPORTS 
Manufactures Total Fuel 
IMPORTS 
Non-Fuel Total 
Balance 
of 
Trade 
1984 8755.2 17954.9 26710.1 7345.1 6570.6 13915.7 12794.4 
1985 8537.9 16821.2 25359.1 6176.4 6976.9 13513.3 12205.8 
1986 7286.7 14992.3 22209.0 3540.6 10503.6 14044.2 8165.0 
1985: 
January 493.6 1056.8 1570.8 484.6 557.8 1042.4 528.4 
February 462.7 988.5 1469.8 460.2 525.1 985.3 484.5 
March 671.9 1262.1 1956.5 563.7 496.5 1060.2 896.3 
April 827.4 1271.7 2124.2 531.9 513.8 1045.7 1078.5 
May 860.3 1349.0 2238.6 423.7 576.9 1000.6 1238.0 
June 747.4 1421.7 2194.5 482.5 482.1 964.6 1229.9 
July 790.6 1370.6 2184.6 396.3 560.7 957.0 1227.6 
August 769.8 1379.5 2170.3 509.1 564.2 1073.3 1097.0 
September 795.7 1587.7 2403.8 530.8 568.2 1099.0 1304.8 
October 676.9 1667.2 2369.6 625.0 631.4 1256.4 1113.2 
November 607.2 1664.1 2291.6 584.7 626.9 1213.6 1078.0 
December 834.4 1802.3 2664.7 583.9 871.3 1455.2 1209.5 
1986: 
January 520.1 1371.2 1909.2 519.4 689.2 1208.6 700.6 
February 595.4 1138.6 1751.2 435.4 687.6 1123.0 628.2 
March 881.0 1259.8 2157.6 280.3 585.7 1021.1 1136.5 
April 820.0 1335.3 2172.0 203.9 676.5 880.4 1291.6 
May 821.3 1453.6 2290.8 269.5 681.8 951.3 1339.5 
June 607.8 1380.4 2001.0 228.6 700.1 928.7 1072.3 
July 689.3 1504.0 2206.9 265.8 933.1 1198.9 1008.0 
August 641.3 1445.4 2098.5 237.5 911.5 1149.0 949.5 
September 559.1 1280.2 1852.9 254.6 1058.1 1312.7 540.2 
October 389.9 939.3 1340.9 265.3 1154.5 1419.5 -78.9 
November 424.1 839.4 1273.5 256.8 1051.3 1308.1 -34.6 
December 337.1 975.1 1327.9 323.5 1219.1 1542.6 -214.7 
1987: 
January 321.6 923.4 1259.0 334.3 986.4 1320.7 -61.7 
February 386.2 1053.8 1450.7 336.0 804.9 1140.9 309.8 
March 456.2 960.1 1427.8 453.0 685.9 1138.9 288.9 
April 596.4 1055.1 1667.9 367.3 812.8 1180.1 487.8 
May 778.0 1386.8 2183.9 444.5 743.4 1187.9 996.0 
June 985.4 1637.6 2641.4 302.1 907.0 1209.1 1432.3 
July 976.2 1897.6 2892.0 334.5 1135.3 1469.8 1422.2 
August 871.7 1883.6 2769.7 494.1 825.8 1319.9 1449.8 
September 869.7 1848.4 2733.1 471.6 724.3 1195.9 1537.2 
October 605.8 1882.8 2505.9 456.7 855.7 1312.2 1193.7 
November 532.0 1733.50 2284.7 348.1 897.4 1245.5 1039.2 
Sources: Developed from Funex and Macroecondmica data 
Table 11 
Treasury Revenue and Spending 
Index of Index of Real Index of Real Degree of 
Real Value of Value of Cover of 
Value of Fiscal Tax Treasury 
Spending1 Revenue1 Revenue1 Spending2 
1985 117.0 
January 67.6 92.6 92.3 
February 94.3 114.7 107.4 
March 95.8 72.2 97.9 126.8 
April 64.3 85.6 85.8 
May 81.2 123.7 101.3 
June 99.6 97.7 110.4 146.5 
July 117.7 113.8 98.9 
August 112.6 95.0 117.3 
September 89.6 96.1 95.8 111.5 
October 92.0 104.9 96.3 
November 147.3 94.8 104.4 
December 137.9 108.9 92.3 95.7 
1986 80.2 
January 141.6 141.0 96.2 
February 119.6 125.3 190.7 
March 167.7 97.3 93.2 99.2 
April 145.9 95.8 107.7 
May 140.6 103.1 94.5 
June 127.6 114.1 115.6 88.4 
July 143.6 115.7 124.0 
August 137.6 101.4 106.8 
September 148.2 119.6 109.9 91.7 
October 193.0 155.7 152.7 
November 198.3 134.8 151.1 
December 455.3 147.9 135.2 60.6 
1987 
January 120.7 105.3 119.9 
February 111.5 98.1 132.9 
March 72.3 90.5 114.1 112.9 
April 170.4 147.0 136.7 
May 130.4 102.9 100.6 
June 163.2 112.0 93.5 91.2 
July 139.2 97.0 101.0 
August 112.1 105.0 99.0 
September 144.5 100.0 97.8 89.3 
October 152.2 107.9 103.4 
1 Base Index mid-1985=100. Deflated by IGP-DI (FGV) 
2 (Fiscal Revenue)/(Expenditure) % 
Source: Developed from data of the Central Bank of Brazil, FGV and Macroecondmica. 
Table 12 
Real Wage and Real Exchange Rate 
Real Wage, March 1986, Index = 100 
Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
Base Index 
March 
1986=100 
Modern 
Sector1 
Workers 
without 
Contracts2 
Self 
Employed3 
Sao Paulo 
Industrial 
Sector4 
1983 102.7 94.3 64.8 77.4 111.3 
1984 92.4 80.2 70.1 75.6 108.6 
1985 95.3 85.8 76.0 85.7 110.5 
1986 114.6 119.5 126.4 104.4 98.7 
1985: 
January 87.7 81.2 68.6 78.6 105.2 
February 87.5 78.3 67.1 75.8 108.1 
March 84.6 78.5 67.6 73.3 105.2 
April 84.9 74.0 67.3 77.3 111.4 
May 93.8 81.4 70.5 89.4 116.6 
June 96.4 86.2 75.4 90.4 118.2 
July 94.9 88.1 75.1 92.3 119.7 
August 94.6 89.9 78.7 89.6 110.7 
September 94.8 86.3 83.9 84.4 111.8 
October 95.0 86.4 77.9 91.4 112.3 
November 107.7 95.5 89.0 96.9 104.3 
December 121.4 104.0 90.7 89.5 106.1 
1986: 
January 97.2 99.6 91.5 92.0 99.3 
February 96.1 94.8 86.3 92.1 99.2 
March 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
April 106.0 107.0 102.1 102.0 100.6 
May 109.7 116.6 112.0 103.4 100.9 
June 110.3 113.8 120.6 103.0 100.4 
July 116.4 120.6 132.1 105.8 99.5 
August 118.9 124.3 142.6 107.5 98.1 
September 120.5 127.0 139.3 108.8 97.7 
October 122.4 128.8 150.5 111.6 97.8 
November 127.8 136.8 166.9 114.6 97.1 
December 149.8 165.2 173.2 111.6 93.3 
1987: 
January 115.6 139.0 150.9 101.1 91.7 
February 111.4 137.5 143.9 98.6 96.9 
March 106.0 128.0 130.4 106.6 98.4 
April 101.5 107.2 110.5 103.1 93.2 
May 98.9 101.7 100.2 101.6 93.0 
June 93.0 102.1 95.5 101.2 95.5 
July 91.4 97.5 96.9 91.9 98.5 
1 Workers with work permits 
2 Workers without work permits 
3 'Conta propia' 
4 FIESP wages 
Sources: Developed from IBGE, Conjuntura Econdmica and International Financial Statistics. 
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